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1. Introduction 
1.1 Outline of the Concerted Action 
The Concerted Action creates a network of researchers addressing the issue of effective-
ness of international environmental agreements. It creates a forum for the development 
of a broadly based consensus on the most important factors that influence effectiveness 
as well as the most successful research strategies for identifying and analysing these fac-
tors. The ultimate aim is to generate ideas and suggest directions for future research, as 
well as to stimulate larger collaborative projects or research programmes. In addition to 
improving research on the effectiveness of international environmental agreements, the 
Concerted Action aims to provide important insights to those responsible for the design 
and administration of international environmental agreements. 
The work is based on a classification of international environmental agreements, an in-
clusive definition of ‘effectiveness,’ and a preliminary list of factors to be considered. 
Multilateral environmental agreements are classified in three categories: (1) global envi-
ronmental agreements (2) regional environmental agreements (involving significantly 
fewer than all countries), and (3) the environmental legislation of the European Commu-
nity (i.e. involving a specific institutional structure to generate and implement the 
agreements). 
The Concerted Action organises six workshops staggered over a period of 24 months, 
two for each category of agreement. These workshops are designed to present the current 
state of research from each respective category and to develop broadly based documents 
outlining strong hypotheses arising from this research. The second set of workshops in 
each category is designed to build upon and develop the results of the first workshop. 
1.2 The Agenda-Setting Workshop 
The Noordwijk workshop marked the first meeting of European scholars studying the ef-
fectiveness of regional and global environmental agreements. European scholars focus-
ing more exclusively on the European Union level agreements met in a separate work-
shop on 25-27 September 1998 in London. The purpose of the Noordwijk workshop was 
to compare scientific approaches and methods, empirical data, main findings, and re-
search priorities in this field of research. It was anticipated, furthermore, that a compari-
son of research findings and methodologies would be useful in order to establish a meth-
odology and research framework facilitating and improving comparison of the various 
streams of research presently being carried out in Europe on the issue of effectiveness of 
international environmental agreements. Two papers by Oran Young and Arild Under-
dal, with contributions from Matthijs Hisschemöller, and Konrad von Moltke, provided 
the background to the Noordwijk workshop. After an initial session devoted to these pa-
pers, the workshop broke into four working groups to consider major issues for the Con-
certed Action. Reports from the working groups are included in this report. The work-
shop agenda and list of participants can be found in Annex. The second round of work-
shops, which will be convened in 1999, will focus in detail on particularly promising and 
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challenging research issues and research questions, empirical data and methodologies for 
future research in the field. 
1.3 Project Methodology 
Oran Young’s paper, “The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes” and 
Arild Underdal et al.’s paper “The Study of Regime Effectiveness” (Appendices I and II) 
provided the methodological background for the workshop. Significant congruence was 
found between the papers. Both papers isolated the dependent and independent variables 
of the problem of regime effectiveness, and discussed in detail methodological issues re-
lating to the analysis of these variables.  
1.3.1 The Dependent Variable: Regime Effectiveness 
Underdal et al.’s paper begins its analysis of the dependent variable, regime effective-
ness, from the perspective that current understandings of regime effectiveness, premised 
on the idea of the regime’s performance of a specific function or set of functions, or its 
general ability to ‘solve’ the problem(s) that motivated its establishment, is not suffi-
ciently precise to be used in empirical research. Young agrees with the limited utility of 
this approach, noting an often unjustified correlation between regime implementation 
and problem resolution (or failure thereof) can lead to imperfect analysis. The challenge, 
in Young’s view, is to isolate the degree to which the regime’s operation can account 
specifically for improvement of the problem. The papers isolate several basic questions 
that must be grappled with in order to develop an effective conceptual framework for 
understanding regime effectiveness.  
First, what precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? In this sense, it is important 
to distinguish between the impact of the international environmental agreement itself and 
the costs incurred and positive and negative side-effects generated through the efforts to 
establish or maintain it. As well, Young and Underdal et al. note that a distinction should 
be made between the formal output flowing from the agreement’s establishment (i.e. the 
norms, principles and rules constituting the agreement itself) and the set of consequences 
flowing from the implementation and adaptation to the international environmental 
agreement. In the context of environmental policy, the latter concept may be further re-
fined. A distinction can be drawn between outcomes – consequences in the form of 
changes to human behaviour, including positive effects, deterrence and compellance, and 
impacts – consequences that materialise as changes to the state of the biophysical envi-
ronment itself. Young notes increased preference for the analysis of outcomes rather than 
outputs or impacts, since a behavioural emphasis, though characterised by methodologi-
cal problems related to causality, avoids even greater difficulties inherent to measuring 
impacts. 
Second, against which standard of success is regime effectiveness to be evaluated? In 
this respect, one of the most important considerations surrounds the point (or trajectory) 
of reference against which this standard is compared. In the current research, several dif-
ferent points of reference are being used. Young describes the pure theory of regimes, 
which compares regime function with an assumed ideal wherein the regime’s institu-
tional arrangements are fully operational, have universal participation, and are undis-
torted by external factors. The counterpart of pure theory, contextualised theory, is more 
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commonly used in the discipline. It analyses “variance in the outcomes flowing from so-
cial interactions that can be explained in terms of the operation of regimes.” One com-
mon approach to this end is assessing the hypothetical state of affairs that would have 
come about had the international environmental agreement never existed. Another is 
evaluation of the international environmental agreement against an ‘ideal’ solution, in 
technical terms the ‘collective optimum.’ Evidently, measures of success will vary de-
pending upon which of the reference points is used. 
Third, what kinds of measurement operations are needed to be able to attribute a ‘suc-
cess rating’ to a particular international environmental agreement? There are several dis-
tinct challenges related to shifting to an empirical level of analysis. Both points of refer-
ence commonly used in contextualised theory are problematic. The no-regime scenario is 
counterfactual and must be inferred as it cannot be observed. Determining the collective 
optimum may be even more difficult. In addition, both cases require that we distinguish 
the effects brought about by the international environmental agreement from those ef-
fects that are caused by other factors (such as changes in technology, economic incen-
tives, or developments endogenous to nature itself). Young points out an additional 
methodological difficulty related to the life cycles of regimes, wherein effectiveness 
typically follows a pattern of ebb and flow. These patterns prevent the untimely assess-
ment of many regimes, particularly in cases where the regimes are designed to adapt and 
change over time. 
1.3.2 Independent Variables: Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Agreements 
Young and Underdal et al. go on to assess the independent variables of the problem of 
regime effectiveness. To the question, “why are some international environmental 
agreements more ‘effective’ than others?” two possible lines of enquiry are given.  
The first line of enquiry concerns the characteristics of the problem, and to this end 
Young outlines several common elements of analysis: collaboration vs. co-ordination 
problems; transparency; regional vs. global problems; small vs. large actor groups, in-
definite vs. short-term Cupertino. Both Young and Underdal et al. examine various ty-
pologies that have been developed. Underdal et al. suggest that substantial work is 
needed to advance a general theory explaining precisely how various problem character-
istics influence regime effectiveness. First, the various typologies need to be analysed for 
possible overlap and/or differentiation in substantive content. It is suggested that typolo-
gies such as those developed by the Tübingen1 or Oslo/Seattle2 teams could be used to 
assess the basic problem structure, while game theory models could be used in the analy-
sis of specific strategic choice situations. Second, empirical research is encouraged to de-
                                                   
1
  Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, “The Tübingen Project on ‘Dis-
tributive Consequences and Regime Robustness’: Research Design and Preliminary Results,” 
presented at the workshop, Concerted Action on the Effectiveness of International Environ-
mental Agreements, Noordwijk, October 16, 1998; Volker Rittberger and Michael Zürn, "Re-
gime Theory: Findings from the Study of “East-West” Regimes," Cooperation and Conflict 
26 (1991): 165–83. 
2
  Edward L. Miles et al., Explaining Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence 
(forthcoming). 
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termine specifically how problem characteristics influence regime effectiveness, particu-
larly with reference to different stages of the regime. In particular, multivariate analysis, 
analysis of characteristic interplay, and ‘large-N’ studies are needed. 
The second major line of enquiry related to the independent variable examines variance 
in the problem-solving capacity of different systems. Underdal et al. note that ‘capacity’ 
is a complex concept that can only be determined with reference to specific tasks, which 
moreover each demand a different set of capabilities and skills. Two major determinants 
of capacity were identified: endogenous factors (factors related to the regime’s character-
istics), and exogenous factors (factors related to the wider political, economic and socie-
tal context in which the regime is embedded). Both factors determining capacity should 
be analysed at different stages of the regime. 
In the study of effectiveness, several research questions arise concerning endogenous 
factors that affect regime capacity. Factors of note related to regime attributes and design 
include: capacity for flexible response, well-constructed systems of implementation re-
view (SIRs), problem-solving approach, funding requirements, and substantive rules and 
regulations. Underdal et al. note that research is needed to isolate sophisticated generali-
sations about the effectiveness of different types of rules and regulations as policy in-
struments. Young points out the need to establish clear linkages between regime attrib-
utes and design features, on the one hand, and effectiveness, on the other, particularly 
with respect to the causal sequence of outputs, outcomes and impacts.  
Underdal et al. note the research challenge of ascertaining how a regime’s institutional 
setting influences the content and form of the regime. This research question involves 
thinking about institutions as arenas and organisations as actors. As such, the challenge 
is to analyse how the rules and norms of various institutions (as arenas) influence regime 
formation, and how differences between organisations (as actors) influence regime for-
mation and implementation. However, Young disagrees with this approach, arguing that 
institutional arrangements merely serve as channels for the behaviour of its membership 
and other relevant actors, and cannot be understood as actors in themselves. 
Several exogenous factors of interest to the study of regime effectiveness were isolated 
in the two agenda-setting papers.  
First, Underdal et al. note that a sophisticated analytical framework needs to be devel-
oped to determine how the distribution of power within the regime influences its effec-
tiveness in terms of regime formation and implementation. This could be done, for ex-
ample, by developing a model that links the distribution of power with the configuration 
of interests in the regime.  
A second factor, skill and energy (entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership), is an im-
portant, though elusive area of study. Related to this factor is the role of knowledge and 
its accompanying network of researchers (‘epistemic communities’) in policy formation, 
implementation and regime effectiveness.  
A third area of research related to exogenous factors is the sense of community or iden-
tity in the international sphere that can influence the capacity for collective action within 
the regime. Young notes the connection between a regime’s institutional arrangements 
and the unique social practices that consequently develop around them, giving rise to a 
community of actors enmeshed within a complex set of relationships. This community of 
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actors legitimises and aids in the functioning of the regime by ‘gluing’ the different sys-
tems of governance together. Both Young and Underdal et al. note the methodological 
difficulties related to this area of study, and the importance of developing analytical tools 
and models to better understand the role of civil society in regime effectiveness.  
Fourth, it is important to understand regimes in a contextual perspective; regime inter-
play is a key area of study to this end and several types of interplay are considered. Hori-
zontal linkages refer to connections between international environmental regimes and 
other regimes in operation at the international level. Types of horizontal linkages include 
embedded regimes, nested regimes and clustered regimes. Vertical linkages refer to con-
nections between international environmental regimes and other regimes or institutions 
in operation at lower levels of organisation, such as the domestic level. The relationship 
of environmental regimes with regimes governing other issue areas, such as economic 
activities, is also noted. 
Related to the contextual placement of regimes is the broader setting in which the regime 
is found. To this end, extraordinary external events, such as economic recession, and po-
litical tensions or hostilities are important factors of consideration. Young points out the 
research deficit in this area, relating to the influence of domestic political and economic 
systems and domestic state-society relations on inter-state Cupertino and ultimately re-
gime effectiveness. Young also notes the importance, specific to the study of interna-
tional environmental regimes, of consonance between a regime’s institutions and the 
ecosystem(s) in question, and analyses specific factors to this end, such as ecosystem re-
silience and homogeneity. 
1.4 The Noordwijk Workshop 
The Noordwijk workshop was opened by two introductions. Helmut Breitmeier com-
mented on the papers by Young and by Underdal et al. Ellen Hey provided a legal per-
spective on the issues being addressed. These two presentations gave rise to a general 
discussion. 
The participants were subsequently divided into three working groups on: 
• Regime Effectiveness: Concept, Measurement, and Relationship to Other Concepts 
• The Role of Endogenous Factors 
• The Role of Exogenous Factors 
 
Noordwijk Workshop  7
2. Workshop Reports, Saturday 17 October 
2.1 Working Group on ‘Regime Effectiveness: Concept, Measurement 
and Relationship to Other Concepts’ 
2.1.1 Procedure 
Taking the papers by Young and Underdal et al. as starting points, the group was assem-
bled to discuss concepts related to the dependent variable, i.e. regime effectiveness. In 
doing so, the group was able to elaborate upon many of the methodological issues raised 
in two papers. Their discussion addressed the three major research questions posed in the 
papers: What is the object of evaluation? Against which standard of success should the 
object be measured? And what kinds of measurement operations are appropriate to this 
research question? 
The group began by analysing broadly-based concepts, such as regime robustness, that 
are related to regime effectiveness. In a similar vein, the group also examined macro-
level consequences flowing from the regime’s implementation, including factor of the 
interplay and nesting of different regimes. Relating to the first research question posed 
by the agenda-setting papers, the group then discussed the causal sequence outlined in 
the paper: outputs to outcomes to impacts. The group then addressed issues relating to 
the standard of success against which the regime’s effectiveness is measured. Finally, the 
group ventured into an examination of the independent variable in a discussion about the 
characteristics of the problem, and the various problem typologies in place for assessing 
regime effectiveness.  
2.1.2 International Regime Effectiveness: Concepts and Relationship to 
Other Macro Level Properties 
The group noted that most assessments of regime consequences are framed in terms of 
problem-solving. From this perspective three concepts seem to merit particular attention: 
effectiveness, robustness, and justice. In addition, the group paid some attention to 
macro-level consequences, notably consequences of (sets) of environmental regimes for 
the international political system at large (including dimensions such as peace, order and 
stability). 
During the discussion, particular emphasis was placed on the concept of robustness (re-
silience) of regimes, defined as the ability of regimes to survive under conditions of 
stress, defined as situations in which at least some actors have incentives to deflect. 
Cases where regimes are not put under stress serve as the baseline for comparison. De-
terminants of robustness remain an open and important question for further empirical re-
search. It is hypothesised that regimes which are effective (in terms of problem-solving) 
are likely to be robust as well. Furthermore, (perceived) justice is likely to enhance both 
effectiveness and robustness. 
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In addition, the group discussed the challenge of analysing regime interplay. The effec-
tiveness of an environmental regime may be significantly influenced by regimes estab-
lished to manage economic activities (such as trade and investment). Conversely, envi-
ronmental regimes may affect other regimes (i.e. international trade). Aggregation in a 
hierarchical sense (nesting) may lead the environmental regime to have effects more 
generally in world politics (i.e., create rules which become more universally applied after 
being ‘invented’ in the environmental domain, such as prior informed consent, or effects 
in the area of environment and security). As well, top-down effects from the broader 
realm of world politics to the international environmental domain are possible. More-
over, problem-solving in the environmental domain may create unintended malign con-
sequences elsewhere. 
2.1.3 From Outputs to Outcomes to Impacts 
For any causal reasoning along the theoretical sequence of outputs - outcome - impacts 
(see papers by Young and Underdal et al., Appendices I and II), the advice of J. S. Mills 
may be useful: (1) factors must be strongly correlated, (2) the cause must precede the ef-
fect in time, and (3) no factor not included in the model explains the outcome. Single 
case studies have been particularly useful in early research on regime effectiveness. In 
order to enhance the generalisability of the findings and limit the threats to validity 
posed by multiple independent variables under scrutiny, it is advisable to embark on 
structured comparative case studies and/or large-N studies which allow for substantial 
variation of the dependent and independent variable scores. 
Since causality cannot be unambiguously inferred in the case of quasi-experimental re-
search, theory development explicating the mechanisms at work, and specification of the 
expected outcomes are of particular importance. Ideally, rival theories suggest different 
outcomes and allow researchers to examine their relative explanatory power. 
2.1.4 Standards in Assessing Regime Effectiveness 
The members of the working group emphasised problem-solving as the central aspect of 
regime effectiveness. Quite often, it is presumed that researchers actually know what 
problem-solving constitutes. Assessing the effect of international regimes includes at 
least two of the following steps: determining (1) the no-regime counterfactual (eg., per-
formance in the absence of a regime), (2) the collective optimum (which may be derived 
as an optimal environmental, ethical, political or economic optimum), and (3) the actual 
performance relative to (1) and/or (2). A first requirement is to make clear which of the 
two standards ((1) or (2) above) is used in the assessment. 
Most assessments of regime effectiveness seem to be framed in terms of standard (1). 
The no-regime counterfactual may, for example, be derived from projections at a speci-
fied point in time (i.e., a business-as-usual scenario), however, an ex post perspective in 
the tradition of the evaluation literature would allow for a plausible reconstruction of 
what would most likely have happened in the absence of a regime. In general, it seems 
more difficult to derive collective optima, although in fortunate cases expert advice can 
provide some guidance. It is important only to compare optima of the same class across 
various regimes, i.e. not to confuse ecological and economic criteria of what constitutes 
a good solution. 
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Any assessment of effectiveness implies a causal inference, i.e. attributing a certain ef-
fect to the existence and operation of a regime. One of the intriguing challenges in re-
gime analysis is to separate the impact of a regime from effects brought about by other 
factors. The group suggested that one of the potential contributions of this Concerted Ac-
tion program could be to put together a brief ‘manual of best practices’ for assessing re-
gime effectiveness. 
2.1.5 The Effect of Problem Structure and Situation Structure 
The study of international regimes has produced substantial evidence in support of the 
general proposition that the prospect for effective Cupertino depends heavily on charac-
teristics of the problem addressed. The group noted that somewhat different typologies 
have been used. For example, the Tübingen team has focused partly on a taxonomy re-
ferring to ‘objects of contention’ and partly on situation structures described in game 
theory terms. For its part, the Oslo/Seattle team has developed a scale of ‘political ma-
lignancy’ based on the presence of externalities, competition and asymmetries. The 
group agreed that it would be worthwhile to make an effort to examine in depth the rela-
tionship between or among such typologies. Some members suggested that ‘problem 
structure’ and ‘situation structure’ typologies could be seen as largely complementary in 
the sense that the former seemed useful primarily for categorising the basic problem 
while the latter could be used to analyse more specific strategic choices arising at differ-
ent points in the life-cycle of a regime. 
2.1.6 General Comments 
Questions regarding differences in effectiveness among private international regimes 
(i.e., regimes where private actors play a dominant role) vis-à-vis government-dominated 
regimes were relegated to the working group on Endogenous Factors. In addition, the lat-
ter working group was encouraged to look at the internalisation of regime norms and 
rules. 
2.2 Working Group on ‘The Role of Endogenous Factors’ 
2.2.1 Procedure 
As a starting point, the group noted that the agenda setting papers by Young and Underdal et 
al. included useful sections on the role of endogenous (institutional) factors. However, given 
the nature of the papers, these sections were quite general. Hence, in terms of procedure, 
quite naturally, the group developed a three stage approach. First, a rough ‘institutional uni-
verse’ was assembled. The group then quickly went through this list and rather impressionis-
tically ranked the different factors first, in terms of the degree to which they are interesting 
for further research in the field and second, in terms of their potential importance for regime 
effectiveness. These two aspects are of course closely related, but they are not identical. For 
instance, given that decision-making rules in practice vary little across many international 
contexts, it could be argued that they are comparatively uninteresting as subjects for further 
research. However, the importance of decision-making rules for international outcomes and 
ultimately effectiveness can hardly be dismissed. Noting this caveat, the group used an A, B 
or C system to rank the factors. Not surprisingly, there were not many Cs. As the final and 
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most substantive step, the group spent some time discussing almost all of the identified fac-
tors in more detail. However, given the very limited time available and the sheer complexity 
of the ‘endogenous agenda,’ from this round of discussion only some brief observations and 
reflections related to these factors can be reported.  
2.2.2 General and Overriding Factors 
Although Underdal et al’s distinction between the ‘procedural,’ or basic and more ‘substan-
tive’ and ‘programmatic’ aspects of regimes is generally analytically helpful, the group ex-
perienced considerable difficulties in applying it during the quick run-through of their list of 
factors. Nonetheless, they did find it useful to distinguish between ‘general/overriding’ re-
gime features, i.e. more analytical constructs such as ‘flexibility’, and more ‘specific’ and di-
rectly observable regime features such as decision-making procedures. It is also possible to 
see the general/overriding factors as functions which regimes must carry out in order to be 
effective. A list of six general and overriding regime features was assembled: 1) capability to 
deal with complexity; 2) robustness; 3) flexibility/dynamism; 4) equity/fairness; 5) problem-
solving capacity; and 6) transparency. In terms of these features, the group generally con-
cluded that the best way to get an analytical handle on these aspects is to work through the 
specific factors and, particularly, to assess their interplay. 
2.2.3 Specific Factors 
The group identified a set of sixteen specific factors; they are presented and discussed in the 
order that they were identified (in other words, quite haphazardly). Let us then briefly go 
through some main observations related to these factors. All factors are ‘A rated’, unless 
specifically indicated otherwise. 
Systems for implementation review. Although important contributions have been made in this 
field, as noted in the agenda-setting papers, this was clearly seen as an important, multi-
faceted issue for further research. SIRs can generally be described as institutions through 
which Parties share information, compare activities, review performance, handle non-
compliance, and adjust commitments.3 Specifically, the group discussed three main clusters 
of issues related to SIRs. First, such systems can obviously make important contributions to 
the general transparency and access to information within regimes. Second, the effective op-
eration of such systems is probably dependent upon a well-tuned balance and interaction 
with other regime bodies, such as its funding mechanisms. Third, the effective operation of 
such systems is also dependent upon the design of the regime’s regulations. Some regula-
tions are simply more ‘verifiable’ than others are. The group noted that although all three 
clusters are interesting for further research, the second cluster, i.e. the balance and interaction 
with other regime bodies, in particular is important for further clarification. 
Non-compliance and dispute settlement procedures. Such procedures spell out the agreed re-
gime-specific procedures for handling situations of non-compliance from one or more Par-
ties. This factor relates to the involvement and role of regime bodies such as Implementation 
Committees and the Conferences of the Parties, and the possible use of positive or negative 
incentives to strengthen future compliance. In terms of interest for further research, this issue 
was given a somewhat more moderate B/A ranking, primarily indicating that the issue needs 
                                                   
3
  D.G. Victor, K. Raustiala, and E.B. Skolnikoff (eds), The Implementation and Effective-
ness of International Environmental Commitments, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, p. 3. 
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to be linked to the broader issue of SIRs. Viewed in isolation, the procedures seem to have 
little clout. Interesting developments for further scrutiny were noted within the World Bank 
and the Commission for Environmental Cupertino (CEC; related to NAFTA). 
Decision-making rules. A central distinction in this context can be made between rules call-
ing for consensus among Parties and rules allowing for some sort of majority decision. It was 
noted that there is a need to substantiate the notion that consensus is bad for decisions, but 
good for implementation – and vice versa with respect to majority rules. To this end, inter-
esting case studies include CEC, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES), and the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Moreover, two issues for fur-
ther study were suggested. First, the relationship between formal rules and practical effects – 
and possible ‘hidden stick’ effects in this connection – was brought up. Second, the institu-
tional fit/match between decision-making rules at different levels was mentioned. 
Access procedures and issues. This broad issue includes dimensions such as the right of 
other governmental and non-governmental organisations to participate in meetings within 
regime bodies, and the access of such groups and the public-at-large to information submit-
ted by the Parties. The issue is clearly linked to the even broader and general issue of regime 
transparency. A need was noted to distinguish between access at the various phases of a re-
gime’s development, for instance between the decision-making phase and the implementa-
tion phase. Moreover, the issue needs to be linked to the study of exogenous factors and the 
role of civil society. 
Funding mechanisms. This issue is also linked with several other factors, including access 
and participation issues, and the broader issues of SIRs and enhancing compliance. For in-
stance, in the context of the ozone regime, the establishment of the Multilateral Fund in 1990 
undoubtedly increased the interest of developing countries in further participation within the 
regime. Indeed, such funds may turn out to be a key factor in strengthening compliance 
among developing countries (although progress so far has been sketchy). Oil compensation 
funds were noted as a different type of funding mechanism, in this case related to questions 
of liability. Moreover, it was noted that there are interesting lessons to be learnt from the 
Structural Funds in the context of the European Community, particularly related to technol-
ogy. Funding issues also, of course, touch upon more general concerns of fairness and eq-
uity.  
Legal nature (of commitments). The main distinction here is legally binding ‘hard law’ 
commitments versus politically and morally binding ‘soft law’ commitments. Here, the in-
terplay between the two forms of commitment was seen as especially interesting for further 
research.  
Specificity of commitments. Apart from having interesting links to the legal nature of com-
mitments, it was noted that the specificity of commitments has important implications for the 
operation of SIRs and the general issue of regime transparency. 
‘Tailoring’ of commitments. This refers to designing commitments so as to maximise long-
term benefits and positive indirect effects. For example, commitments might need to be sec-
tor-specific so as to provide an incentive for technological innovation, ultimately benefiting 
the problem-solution in the long run in some contexts (i.e. climate change). In other contexts, 
such innovation will be supported by applying a similar commitment across different sectors 
(i.e. ozone depleting substances). An area worth further research is how to optimise the tai-
loring of commitments under varying circumstances. 
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(Economic) instruments. Examples of economic instruments include Joint Implementation, 
systems for emissions trading, and eco-labelling. It was noted, however, that a good cata-
logue of potential economic instruments is far from complete. Generally, such instruments 
can be seen as efforts to better cope with environmental and economic circumstances that 
vary widely on a global scale. There is a very important interplay between economic and 
other instruments.  
The organisation of scientific/technological advisory work. Interesting issues here included 
how to design regimes that are able to cope with normal controversies within the scientific 
community and to deal with fact that panels are not balanced.  
Membership/scale. Within the Concerted Action context, dividing international environ-
mental agreements into global and regional ‘nodes’, this dimension is of course especially 
interesting. Are there marked differences in design and implications for effectiveness related 
to the scale of the regime – global or regional? It can be assumed that regional solutions, 
first, imply a greater homogeneity of the Parties involved and, second, generally stand a bet-
ter chance of handling difficult trade-off challenges. Moreover, in terms of global problems, 
it is interesting to consider under what conditions regional sub-solutions are possible and ef-
fective. 
Role of secretariats. Interesting dimensions here are related to the autonomy of such secre-
tariats and their guardian functions related to agreements. Are they formally identified as 
such guardians? There is an important interplay between the role of secretariats and the 
complexity of the underlying problem structure. If the problem is highly complex, the role of 
the secretariat gains particular importance. As well, an important interplay with national for-
eign ministries was noted. 
The group also briefly discussed aspects including interplay and linkages to other institu-
tions, capacity to deal with conflicting priorities, and scope/agenda.  
2.2.4 General Comments 
Overall, the group found it interesting and rewarding to carry out an initial brainstorming 
session with an open agenda. However, it was felt that future gatherings should find a way to 
delimit and focus the agenda considerably. 
2.3 Working Group on ‘The Role of Exogenous Factors’ 
2.3.1 Procedure 
Drawing upon the papers by Arild Underdal et al. and Oran Young, the group focused on 
exogenous factors influencing the effectiveness of international environmental agreements. 
In an initial brainstorming, participants randomly listed exogenous factors which were of 
importance in their current work. Second, the participants clarified the variables and clus-
tered them into categories. It should be noted that the categories are not exclusive, but simply 
a convenient way to structure the discussion. Third, the group tried to conceptualise the fac-
tors and to formulate hypotheses relating to their impact upon agreement effectiveness. The 
factors were also examined with respect to whether their role varies across global and re-
gional IEAs. 
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2.3.2 Discussion of Specific Factors 
Non-state actors/societal practices 
 Role of industry. The group noted that this area requires further research, since until now the 
role of industry has been studied primarily at the national level. The question of the concep-
tualisation of industry was raised. Essentially, the problem-specific structure of industry 
needs to be taken into account. Can status quo, mixed-interest and environmental actors be 
distinguished? Does the homogeneity/heterogeneity of industry explain effectiveness? How 
does industry affect the power structure within the regime? Can it exert a co-opting influ-
ence? How does it influence the information input to the regime?  
The role of industry may vary depending on the stage of an IEA (formative, negotiation, im-
plementation). Moreover, industry can have an indirect influence beyond its capacity for di-
rect lobbying. It has an ecological modernisation capacity and acts as a knowledge-producer. 
As well, it may form coalitions with NGOs. Other questions were raised. What influence 
does regulatory capture have? Does the degree of regulatory capture influence the effective-
ness (not necessarily fairness) of the IEA? 
Civil society. The group was not entirely satisfied with Oran Young’s definition of civil soci-
ety describing the organisational networks of non-state actors. First, he seems to set civil so-
ciety merely in a national context. However, with respect to IEAs, the emergence of transna-
tional networks is also of interest. Indeed, the notion of a ‘nascent fragmented international 
civil society’ merits further consideration and research. Second, the notion of civil society 
implies a certain degree of self-organisation and autonomy of social actors from the nation 
state. Access to information and other civil rights form an important aspect of civil society. 
Third, shared values, identities etc. also form an integral part of civil society; therefore, a 
(changing) normative dimension needs to be taken into account in addition to the organisa-
tional features of civil society. 
The study of the role and the possibility of building civil society building merits further re-
search. It is however not entirely clear whether and why civil society/democratic govern-
ments contribute positively to the effectiveness of regimes. Civil society may result in a bet-
ter allocation of scarce resources, or it may strengthen the distribution of resources and in-
crease equity. Civil society may improve the order of law, or add to accountability and in-
crease the legitimacy of the regime. Alternatively, it may improve the flow of information in 
the regime.  
Modernisation and the emergence of civil society may in fact facilitate the emergence of 
IEA, which can contribute to or reflect changes in values within civil society. There may be, 
however, a mismatch between the values of civil society and the values reflected in the IEA. 
At the same time, it may cut in both ways. It may be that authoritarianism is the more appro-
priate and/or effective way to deal with some environmental problems. 
An interesting question in this context is the role of parliaments (as representative of civil 
society) and the absence thereof in IEAs. Through IEAs, national parliaments may be dis-
franchised; as a result we see attempts to bring parliaments back into the process, through 
GLOBE and other networks of MPs. Does the involvement of national parliaments contrib-
ute to the effectiveness of IEAs? 
World culture. In the context of preservation of the environment, does a world culture, with 
shared values and perceptions, exist? How do these values emerge, exist and diffuse? How 
do world-wide attitudes, lifestyles and concerns for the global environment influence IEAs 
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and contribute to their effectiveness? It may be that current global trends in favour of liber-
alisation, ‘CNN-isation,’ and ‘CocaCola-isation’ serve to undermine effectiveness of IEAs. 
Deeper research into the question of world culture will require broadening the field of re-
search to take into consideration schools such as constructivism and other disciplines such as 
sociology. 
Media (including the Internet) 
Structure/distribution/equity 
Progressive development of international law. The power of precedent and the notion of 
‘best legal practice’ have an impact on the design and/or the evolution of environmental in-
stitutions. As progressive principles of international law are developed, they are incorporated 
into IEAs, both in terms of their procedural aspects and substantive rights and norms. Exam-
ples of such principles include the principle of differentiated obligations, and the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle. For example, it can be hypothesised that the degree of embodiment and ap-
plication in international law of the Rio principles has had a positive effect on the effective-
ness of IEAs. Generally, it was noted that the development and the use of principles of inter-
national law has a positive effect on regime effectiveness and equity, which sometimes in-
cludes compensation for structural imbalances and has the ability to shape or change power 
relationships. Alternatively, international law principles may also follow a regressive pattern, 
depending upon which principles (economic, social etc.) have precedence/priority. It was 
noted that progressive development might also be an endogenous factor. 
(Im)balance/distribution of knowledge. There is a cleavage in knowledge between North and 
South, and between West and East. Knowledge shapes and pushes interests, and hence the 
OECD countries exert a dominating influence over IEA agenda setting. To this end, the rela-
tionship between knowledge distribution and the effectiveness of IEA needs to be explored. 
How does the (im)balance of knowledge/uneven access to knowledge influence the effec-
tiveness of IEAs ? 
Uncertainty. (Scientific, economic and political) uncertainty is a constant feature of IEAs, 
forming a key characteristic of the problem type. As uncertainty increases, the complexity of 
the problem also increases. It is important to examine several factors related to uncertainty. 
What is the knowledge base? How is the problem assessed? How does uncertainty influence 
the behaviour of political and economic actors? What is the risk behaviour? What are the 
fairness/equity assumptions under uncertainty? How does uncertainty influence the regime 
design? Is the Risikogesellschaft compensated through communication? What are the uncer-
tainty assessments/choices? Are panels, integrated assessment, consensus conferences etc. an 
effective way to deal with uncertainty? It was noted that uncertainty coupled with a weak 
knowledge base may diminish the effectiveness of an IEA. 
Historic relations/degree of interdependence. Are there patterns of relationships among the 
Parties to an IEA? It seems that no permanent coalitions can be observed. Are there is-
sue/problem specific coalitions? Do historic relations or the degree of interdependence influ-
ence actors/coalition behaviour? 
Differentiation. Regional variations in the effectiveness of IEAs can be observed. Thus ex-
ternal factors influencing differentiation have to be investigated. States, for instance, differ in 
certain features such as institutional culture, capacity, communication, adaptation and inno-
vation. What are the criteria for differentiated obligations? 
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Leadership 
Symbolic politics. Symbolic politics often form a part of IEA negotiations. What are these 
‘symbols’? To what extent do they influence effectiveness? 
Leadership type/regime stage. There are different types of leadership, i.e. structural, intellec-
tual, entrepreneurial, individual. How do different types of leadership influence the effec-
tiveness of IEAs? 
Leadership without power/leverage of small or weak actors. The phenomenon of leadership 
without power can be observed in IEAs, namely small countries exerting influence through 
charismatic leadership or the power of ideas. 
Interplay/linkages 
It was noted that interplay among different regimes in general should be a focus of analysis.  
Governance without government. IEAs form only one part among multiple sets of regimes 
within multiple arenas. There is a substantial amount of governance without government in 
the international system. The coexistence of different, conflicting regimes merits more study. 
Several research questions were posed. First, however, the definition of a ‘regime’ is unclear 
– what is a regime and how many are there? Are markets, for instance, regimes? Second, 
what is the interplay, the linkages and the hierarchy among different regimes? What is the re-
lationship between economic and ecological regimes? Are there other important regimes in-
fluencing IEAs, i.e. security, human rights etc.? How are different regimes accommodated? 
Are there principles regulating interplay? Are institutional boundaries among/between envi-
ronmental and non-environmental regimes blurred? It was noted that a study undertaken by 
Carnegy examines cross-sectoral interplay.  
Economic - environmental regimes. Is there a hierarchy of regimes and how does it affect 
IEAs? Is trade a ‘pre-emptive norm’? 
Power of precedent/lessons learned. Is there interbreeding/cross-fertilisation/regime conta-
gion? Do new opportunities arise from new regimes? How do the lessons of other regimes 
influence the formulation or operation of IEAs? Is there a levelling-up? The power of prece-
dent may drive or inhibit innovation.  
Environment - economy - security. Depending on abatement costs or vulnerability, an IEA 
may become part of national security considerations, since they touch upon issues of sover-
eignty, domaine reservée, vital interests etc. Especially in developing countries, environ-
mental issues are considered to be of national security interest.  
Privatisation of sovereign obligation. Increasingly, a privatisation of sovereign obligations 
can be observed. Several questions were formulated. How does the involvement of non-state 
actors influence the form and function of governance? What is the interplay between markets 
and regimes? What is the (legal) nature of contract under privatisation? Who carries respon-
sibility and/or liability? Is it possible to have ‘private’ international regimes? Privatisation 
leads to linkages between different legal systems (private/public). This research question 
touches upon both endogenous and exogenous factors. For example, increasingly successful 
domestic models are transferred to IEAs, as in, for instance, the US, which has exported its 
culture to the IEA. 
Institutional band-wagon effect/’pigs around the trough’. Regimes external to IEAs offer 
their services, and in this sense IEAs are instrumentalised by other regimes. For example, the 
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GEF, UNEP, UNDP etc., searching for a role within the process, offering their services to 
the FCCC.  
Subsidiarity/nested regimes/intermediate decks. How should responsibilities be divided 
across different levels? How are the activities at the different levels co-ordinated? How do 
global and regional regimes influence each other ? 
Fit/spill-over  
General Comments 
These factors are relevant at both the global and the regional level of analysis. The only 
major variation relates to culture and civil society. At the regional level, the fragmenta-
tion of culture is less acute, and the imbalance of knowledge may be less pronounced. 
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Table 2.1 Endogenous and Exogenous Factors Identified by the Working Groups 
Endogenous Factors Exogenous Factors 
General/Overriding Features Role of non-state actors/societal practices 
 • Capability to deal with complexity  • role of industry 
 • robustness  • civil society 
 • flexibility/dynamism  • world culture 
 • equity/fairness  • media 
 • problem-solving capacity  
Structure/Distribution/Equity 
 • transparency  • progressive developments in interna-
tional law 
Specific Regime Features  • (im)balance/distribution of knowledge 
 • systems for implementation review 
(SIRs) 
 • uncertainty 
 • non-compliance and dispute settle-
ment procedures  
 • historic relations/degree of interdepend-
ence 
 • decision-making rules  • differentiation 
 • access procedures and issues Leadership 
 
 • funding mechanisms  • symbolic politics 
 • legal nature (of commitments)   • leadership type/regime stage 
 • specificity of commitments   • leadership without power/leverage of 
small or weak actors 
 • ‘tailoring’ of commitments  Interplay/Linkages 
 
 • instruments (i.e. Joint Implementa-
tion)  
 • governance without government 
 • the organisation of scien-
tific/technical advisory work  
 • economic – environmental regimes 
 • membership/scale   • power of precedent/lessons learned 
 • interplay and linkages to other insti-
tutions  
 • environment/economy/security 
 • capacity to deal with conflicting pri-
orities  
 • privatisation of sovereign obligation 
 • role of secretariats   • institutional band-wagonning/ ‘pigs at 
the trough’ 
 • scope/agenda   • subsidiarity/nested regimes/intermediate 
decks 
 • budgetary matters   • fit/spill-over 
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3. Conclusions 
The Noordwijk Workshop outlined an exceptionally ambitious research agenda which 
has thus far been covered to a modest degree only. Answers to most of the aspects identi-
fied in the Working Groups are not currently possible; more robust hypotheses have been 
developed in some areas than in others. It is also unlikely that the research program im-
plied by the Noordwijk Workshop will be accomplished within the time frame of the 
Concerted Action.  
Nevertheless the ability to articulate a comprehensive and systematic research agenda in 
relation to the effectiveness of international environmental regimes represents a step 
forward, establishing as it does the need for research and creating a benchmark against 
which future research can be measured. The issues raised in the Working Groups repre-
sent ample opportunities for research at all levels -- that is for student projects, disserta-
tions and major research projects -- including joint efforts involving teams from different 
disciplines and different countries. It is to be hoped that the participants in the Noordwijk 
Workshop will advance elements of this agenda over the next few years. At the next 
meeting, scheduled for the fall of 1999, the Concerted Action will turn to the identifica-
tion of priority topics. 
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Appendix I 
The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes:  
A Mid-term Report 
Oran R. Young 
A striking feature of the recent past is the sharp rise both in public concern about large-
scale environmental problems and in the creation of international regimes as a means of 
addressing these problems.
1
 Many see in this development a hopeful sign regarding the 
prospects for solving numerous problems ranging from unsustainable uses of shared 
natural resources (e.g., boundary waters or straddling stocks of fish) through long-range 
transboundary pollution problems (e.g., acid rain) to the challenges associated with 
global environmental changes (e.g., the loss of biological diversity or the alteration of 
the Earth’s climate system). How realistic is this hope? To ask this question is to launch 
an inquiry into the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements or regimes that have 
been established in recent decades to deal with a wide range of environmental problems 
arising at the international level.  
The purpose of this essay is to provide a mid-term report on this enterprise. In the proc-
ess, I seek to assess what we currently know about the effectiveness of international en-
vironmental regimes; determine what more we need to know about these arrangements 
to improve their performance in the future; and evaluate the relative merits of several re-
search strategies available to those desiring to obtain this knowledge. The picture that 
emerges from this survey is a mixed one. We already know a number of things about the 
determinants of regime effectiveness. Yet adding substantially to our current understand-
ing of these matters presents major analytic challenges that will constitute cutting-edge 
concerns for regime theory throughout the foreseeable future.  
1. Defining Effectiveness 
At first glance, the meaning of effectiveness with regard to international environmental 
regimes seems intuitively obvious.
2
 Regimes arise to solve problems. Accordingly, ef-
fectiveness is a measure of the extent to which these arrangements succeed in solving the 
problems that led to their formation. Appealing as this approach to effectiveness is, how-
ever, it has severe limitations as a basis for analyzing the performance of international 
regimes. As numerous observers have pointed out, participants can and often do develop 
widely divergent perceptions of the nature or character of the problem to be solved, and 
regimes frequently come into existence in the absence of consensus in the realm of prob-
lem definition. The danger of ending up with spurious correlations is a constant threat to 
efforts to understand regime effectiveness construed as problem solving. The disappear-
ance or amelioration of a problem following the formation of a regime does not consti-
tute proof that the regime was a causal agent in the process. Conversely, the failure of a 
problem to disappear following regime creation does not justify the conclusion that the 
regime had no effect at all; the problem could well have grown more severe in the ab-
sence of the regime. More generally, the operation of a regime is typically only one of a 
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suite of factors—both intended and unintended—that play some role in determining the 
course of international environmental problems. More often than not, the real problem is 
not in determining whether a regime matters at all but rather in finding ways to deter-
mine the proportion of the variance in the realm of problem solving that can be attributed 
persuasively to the operation of the regime. Yet given the limited size of the universe of 
cases and the amount of variance within this universe, finding ways to demonstrate the 
causal significance of international regimes as problem solvers is a tall order. 
Faced with this somewhat daunting prospect, many analysts have sought alternative 
ways to think about the effectiveness of international regimes. Students of both law and 
politics commonly direct attention to issues of implementation and compliance rather 
than problem solving.
3
 Do regime members take vigorous steps to implement regime 
rules or commitments within their domestic jurisdictions? Do states or subjects operating 
under their auspices comply with regime rules or live up to the commitments they make 
in creating regimes? This alternative has the virtue of being easier to operationalize; it is 
relatively easy to follow efforts to implement regulatory provisions or to get program-
matic activities underway. But it leaves much to be desired as a way to think about effec-
tiveness. Above all, there is no direct relationship between implementation and compli-
ance, on the one hand, and the solution of pressing problems, on the other. Regimes can 
score high in terms of implementation or compliance without solving the problems that 
led to their creation in the first place. Conversely, regimes can have far-reaching conse-
quences, even when their performance seems mediocre with respect to conventional 
measures of implementation and compliance. Some regimes are able to tolerate fairly ex-
tensive violations without becoming ineffectual. As well, regimes may lead to substantial 
alterations in the behavior of key actors that have little or nothing to do with conforming 
to specific rules or commitments. Under the circumstances, a turn toward implementa-
tion and compliance as a way of conceptualizing effectiveness is apt to be accompanied 
by a loss of analytic rigor and a constant battle with empirical messiness.  
Given these difficulties, a growing community of analysts have directed their attention 
toward behavioral consequences as a measure of the effectiveness of regimes. Interna-
tional regimes are not actors in their own right, though they may give rise to organiza-
tions whose function is to administer their provisions.
4
 The question to be answered is 
whether regimes or governance systems play a role in shaping or guiding the behavior of 
those who are actors, including both the states that are ordinarily the formal members of 
international regimes, and the government agencies, corporations, interest groups, and 
even individuals whose behavior is targeted by a regime’s provisions. We want to know, 
in other words, not only whether the United States fulfills its obligations under the terms 
of the regime dealing with ozone-depleting substances, but also whether producers and 
consumers of such substances operating under the jurisdiction of the United States alter 
their behavior in response to the creation and operation of the regime.
5
 Of course, it is 
important to observe that the behavioral effects of regimes include deterrence in the 
sense that actors are induced to refrain from taking steps they would have taken in the 
absence of the regime, as well as compellence in the sense that the presence of the re-
gime induces actors to take steps they would otherwise have failed to take.
6
 As we shall 
see, moreover, both theoretical and methodological challenges are associated with efforts 
to demonstrate the causal connections between the operation of a regime and the behav-
ior of affected actors. For instance, much depends on the extent to which actors are prop-
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erly treated as unitary utility maximizers or as more complex entities that respond to a 
variety of non-utilitarian stimuli.
7
 And regimes are almost always only one of a number 
of forces that operate—simultaneously or sequentially—to shape the behavior of rele-
vant actors, a fact that makes it necessary to devise ways to sort out the relative impact 
of regimes from the impacts of other sources of behavior. Nonetheless, the focus on be-
havior lends empirical content to the study of regime effectiveness, and it has the added 
virtue of preserving a clear link to the underlying concern for problem solving. 
In considerable measure, these approaches to effectiveness map onto the distinctions that 
students of public policy commonly draw among outputs, outcomes, and impacts.
8
 Out-
puts are regulations, programs, and organizational arrangements that actors establish to 
operationalize the provisions of regimes or, in other words, to move them from paper to 
practice.
9
 Outcomes encompass changes in the behavior of those subject to the provi-
sions of regimes, whether these changes involve bringing actions into conformance with 
the requirements of regimes or making other adjustments that become attractive as a re-
sult of the establishment of regimes. For their part, impacts have to do with problem 
solving in that they involve effects measured in terms of the concerns that lead actors to 
create regimes in the first place. Impacts may range from marginal to decisive; there is 
no need to think of them in all-or-nothing terms. In some cases, regimes give rise to new 
problems, whatever their impacts in terms of the problems leading to their creation. 
Clearly, there is every reason to take a lively interest in all three of these types of regime 
consequences. Yet these comments help to account for the growing tendency among re-
gime analysts to focus particular attention on outcomes in contrast to outputs and im-
pacts. The study of behavior allows the observer to avoid the formalism that marks many 
analyses of outputs, while skirting some of the analytic problems associated with efforts 
to demonstrate the occurrence of impacts in a convincing manner.  
Two additional conceptual issues are worthy of consideration in this discussion. An im-
portant difference exists between what we may call the pure theory of regimes and the 
contextualized theory of regimes or, for that matter, social institutions in general. The 
pure theory seeks to illuminate the logic of regimes on the assumptions that specific in-
stitutional arrangements are fully operational, accepted by all relevant subjects as facts of 
life to be complied with as a matter of course, and not subject to distortion resulting from 
the impact of outside forces. Analysis then focuses on the outcomes that can be expected 
to flow from the operation of these arrangements over time.
10
 To take some concrete ex-
amples, this leads to assessments of the probable outcomes resulting from the operation 
of different electoral systems (e.g., proportional representation vs. single-member dis-
tricts), different decision rules in legislative settings or committees, and different struc-
tures of property rights.
11
 Contextualized theory, by contrast, focuses on the extent to 
which regimes actually affect the behavior of those subject to their provisions and on the 
relationship between the character of regimes as they are intended to operate in principle 
and the character of institutional arrangements as they operate in practice. The central 
concern here is to probe whether and to what extent regimes actually do determine the 
flow of collective outcomes in various social settings. Pure theory is largely an analytic 
exercise employing deductive reasoning and, in some cases simulations, to explore the 
dynamics of institutions as such; the results tend to be normative rather than descriptive. 
Contextualized theory is mainly an empirical exercise involving the use of a battery of 
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techniques designed to determine the proportion of the variance in the outcomes flowing 
from social interactions that can be explained in terms of the operation of regimes. While 
both types of analysis are worthwhile, most recent efforts to understand the effectiveness 
of international regimes take the form of contextualized theory.
12
 The central questions 
are: Do regimes matter and what proportion of the variance in world affairs is attribut-
able to the operation of these institutional arrangements? 
In asking whether regimes matter, it is worth noting as well that these arrangements—
both singly and in combination—can generate broader consequences by altering the 
knowledge base available to actors in international society, the relative status of interna-
tional actors, or even the constitutive features of international society as a whole, quite 
apart from their success in solving specific problems.
13
 Taken together, for example, the 
rise of international environmental regimes over the last several decades has surely 
played a part in enhancing the role of nongovernmental organizations in world affairs 
and in sensitizing us to the significance of global civil society as a factor in environ-
mental problem solving.
14
 The study of these broader consequences is obviously impor-
tant. In the long run, their impact may even overshadow the performance of regimes in 
solving or alleviating a variety of specific environmental problems arising at the interna-
tional level. But the study of broader consequences is an endeavor that is separate from 
the analysis of regime effectiveness as such. Conflating the analysis of regime effective-
ness and the study of broader consequences is a recipe for confusion. The focus of this 
article is effectiveness, leaving the question of broader consequences to another occa-
sion. 
2. Variations in Regime Performance 
How much do regimes vary in terms of effectiveness? How can we measure this vari-
ance under real-world conditions? Given the preceding account of the difficulties associ-
ated with the concept of effectiveness, it will come as no surprise that we have yet to de-
vise a straightforward way to operationalize the concept, much less to construct a generic 
index for charting shifts in the effectiveness of individual regimes over time or to com-
pare and contrast different regimes with respect to levels of effectiveness. This is a seri-
ous problem; it limits our ability to treat effectiveness as a dependent variable whose be-
havior can be followed in an unambiguous and uncontroversial manner. Ideally, an in-
terval scale would allow us to track effectiveness in much the same way that we use 
temperature as a measure of the behavior of the human body or gross national product 
(GNP) as a measure of the performance of economic systems. At this stage, the devel-
opment of such a scale is beyond our reach. A more realistic goal over the short run is 
the development of a ordinal scale that would make it possible to rank regimes from high 
to low in terms of effectiveness and to monitor the performance of individual regimes 
over time in these terms.
15
 Even the development of such a scale allowing us to evaluate 
regime effectiveness with confidence seems daunting. Yet some such procedure is essen-
tial for those interested not only in measuring effectiveness but also in framing and test-
ing hypotheses that can help to explain or predict variations in levels of effectiveness 
over time and across regimes.
16
 Realistically, at this stage we should be aiming to devise 
a relatively simple ordinal scale that differentiates among four or five levels of effective-
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ness and that well-informed analysts may use to code the effectiveness of regimes with 
reasonable confidence.
17
  
Notwithstanding these problems of measurement, students of international regimes gen-
erally agree regarding the performance of specific arrangements, at least in general 
terms.
18
 Among those regimes that are widely viewed as ranging from effective to very 
effective are the Antarctic Treaty System, the Great Lakes Water Quality regime, the ar-
rangement covering the dumping or incineration of wastes in the North Sea, and the re-
gime for the protection of the stratospheric ozone layer.
19
 Conversely, the list of regimes 
that most analysts would rank as ineffective or very ineffective includes the agreement 
on the conservation of migratory species of wild animals, the international tropical tim-
ber regime, many of the Regional Seas arrangements operating under the auspices of 
UNEP, and most species-specific and area-specific arrangements dealing with marine 
fisheries.
20
 Most would concur as well in reaching mixed conclusions regarding the ef-
fectiveness of a number of other regimes, such as arrangements dealing with long-range 
transboundary air pollution in Europe, international trade in endangered species of wild 
fauna and flora, pollutants discharged into the Rhine River, and transboundary shipments 
of hazardous wastes. Imprecise as they are, these widely shared rankings offer some 
grounds for optimism regarding efforts to assess the effectiveness of international re-
gimes.  
Most observers would also agree that there are a number of circumstances in which it is 
difficult to arrive at straightforward rankings regarding the effectiveness of regimes. It is 
common for specific arrangements to follow a kind of life cycle, typically becoming in-
creasingly effective with the passage of time and, in some cases, outliving their useful-
ness in due course. The regime dealing with intentional oil pollution at sea, for example, 
clearly became more effective following a shift from discharge standards to equipment 
standards.
21
 Many traditional conservation regimes, which focus on efforts to regulate 
consumptive uses of living resources, have lost effectiveness with the rise of concerns 
for habitat protection and ecosystems management.
22
 Beyond this, there are cases in 
which serious ambiguities impede efforts to arrive at judgments about regime effective-
ness. Most observers agree that the regime for whales and whaling was ineffective dur-
ing its early years but became more effective during the 1970s. But the sharp differences 
of opinion about the effectiveness of this regime in more recent years are attributable not 
to disagreements about the behavioral impacts of the regime but rather to conflicting 
views regarding the purpose of the regime.
23
 Of course, in some cases judgments about 
the effectiveness of regimes must remain tentative until these arrangements have been in 
place long enough to compile a track record sufficient to provide a basis for assessment. 
Obvious examples include the arrangements established during the 1990s to deal with 
problems such as climate change, the loss of biological diversity, and desertification. 
More generally, it is difficult to make early assessments about the effectiveness of re-
gimes based on framework conventions that are intended to initiate a continuing process 
of regime formation.
24
 All these issues complicate efforts to rate specific regimes in 
terms of effectiveness; they give rise to substantial differences of opinion in some cases. 
Unlike the conceptual difficulties discussed in the preceding section, however, these 
matters are largely empirical problems to be solved pragmatically rather than problems 
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that point to disagreements about what we mean in speaking of the effectiveness of re-
gimes. 
Clearly, we have a long way to go in the effort to construct an index of performance that 
will allow us to explore effectiveness systematically as a key variable in regime analysis. 
But even at this stage, we know enough to lay to rest the sterile debate about whether in-
ternational regimes matter at all or are properly understood as epiphenomena that merely 
reflect deeper driving forces in international society.
25
 The essential point to note is that 
substantial variance in effectiveness exists both among regimes and within regimes over 
time. This is not to say that there is consensus among observers about the ranking of par-
ticular regimes on the scale of effectiveness; far from it. But virtually everyone agrees 
that some regimes have been remarkably successful, while others have turned out to be 
dismal failures. Even more common are cases in which performance lies somewhere be-
tween these extremes. It follows that the appropriate course at this time is to turn our at-
tention to a sustained examination of the sources or roots of institutional effectiveness. 
This exercise promises to be far more productive and interesting than a continuation of 
sectarian battles over whether regimes matter. 
3. What Do We Know about the Sources of Effectiveness? 
Research on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes is still at an early 
stage. As the preceding discussion makes clear, serious methodological problems stand 
in the way of progress in this area. Even so, we already know a number of things about 
the sources of institutional effectiveness in this domain, and we have some good leads 
concerning where to direct our attention in analyses of effectiveness during the next 
phase of research on environmental regimes. This section seeks both to pinpoint what we 
know already about the determinants of success, and to characterize what we need to 
know about effectiveness under five headings: problem structure, regime attributes, so-
cial practices, institutional interactions, and broader setting. The following section dis-
cusses plans of attack for broadening and deepening our current understanding of these 
matters. 
Problem Structure 
Some international problems are easier to solve than others. Thus, co-ordination prob-
lems are easier to deal with than collaboration problems, largely because participants 
have no incentive to violate the rules developed to solve co-ordination problems.
26
 De-
vising a successful governance system for air transport is less challenging than devising 
an effective regime to regulate transboundary air pollution. Situations featuring high lev-
els of transparency (in the sense that it is easy to tell whether those subject to regulatory 
rules are complying with their requirements) are easier to deal with than situations in 
which subjects—including private actors as well as public agencies—can violate the 
rules clandestinely.
27
 Consider the difference between equipment standards and dis-
charge standards with regard to intentional oil pollution at sea as a case in point. Other 
things being equal, problems involving large numbers of actors, either as parties to the 
agreements themselves or as subjects of the regulatory arrangements devised, are harder 
to deal with than small-number situations.
28
 Think of the differences between the protec-
tion of the stratospheric ozone layer and the Earth’s climate system in these terms. Simi-
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lar remarks are in order about the length of the shadow of the future.
29
 In cases where 
parties are engaged in interactions expected to last indefinitely (e.g., the governance sys-
tem for Antarctica), incentives to cooperate will be stronger than in cases where the rela-
tionships are short-lived (e.g., short-term arrangements dealing with the exploitation of a 
finite resource). 
What we lack at this stage is a comprehensive or generic index to rank and compare 
problems in terms of the difficulty of solving them. A number of analysts have made 
sustained efforts to develop an index of this sort. The most influential of these efforts in-
volve the problem-structural approach of the Tübingen group, which looks at regime 
formation as a means of solving conflicts and rates problems in terms of what is called 
‘regime conduciveness,’ and the work of the Oslo/Seattle group, which focuses on inter-
ests or preferences and looks to game-theoretical constructs as a way of differentiating 
among problems in terms of how hard it will be to solve them.
30
 Each of these ap-
proaches has added to our understanding of problem structure. But as I have demon-
strated elsewhere, both are fraught with analytical difficulties and problems of opera-
tionalization that limit their usefulness as procedures for rating real-world problems on a 
scale of hardness.
31
 
Regime Attributes  
Regime design matters.
32
 Because regimes are not actors in their own right, it is inappro-
priate to think of these constructs as agents that succeed or fail in connection with as-
signments they receive from their creators.
33
 Nevertheless, institutional arrangements do 
serve to channel the behavior of both their formal members and wider arrays of actors 
operating under the auspices of regime members. In the process, they affect the content 
of collective outcomes flowing from interactions among actors in international society. 
Here, too, we already have some knowledge of the roots of institutional effectiveness. A 
capacity to respond flexibly and to evolve over time is particularly important to the suc-
cess of regimes that deal with environmental issues, where our understanding of the 
relevant biophysical systems is developing rapidly, in some cases as a consequence of 
the operation of the regimes themselves. Well-constructed systems of implementation 
review (SIRs) appear to be important as methods of retaining the attention of policymak-
ers and avoiding the onset of the ‘out of sight, out of mind’ syndrome in almost every 
case.34 There is much to be said for approaching issues of compliance with the rules and 
decisions of regimes as management problems rather than or in addition to enforcement 
problems.
35
 The extent to which regimes require secure sources of funding to prove suc-
cessful depends upon the nature of the tasks they are expected to perform. Programmatic 
tasks such as helping developing countries to avoid increases in the production and con-
sumption of ozone-depleting substances, for instance, present greater funding require-
ments than procedural tasks such as making annual decisions regarding allowable har-
vest levels for living resources. 
As in the case of problem structure, much remains to be learned about the role of regime 
attributes as determinants of effectiveness. While many see the widespread use of con-
sensus rules at the international level as a source of weakness, for example, the links be-
tween decision rules and regime effectiveness are poorly understood.
36
 Similar remarks 
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are in order regarding the role of what we now think of as noncompliance procedures 
(NCPs) in contrast to more formal dispute settlement procedures (DSPs), which are typi-
cally included in the constitutive provisions of international environmental regimes, but 
which seldom loom large in the actual operations of these regimes.
37
 More generally, we 
need to improve our understanding of the relationships between regime attributes, on the 
one hand, and effectiveness construed in terms of outputs, outcomes, and impacts, on the 
other. Thus, regimes that look impressive at the level of outputs are not necessarily suc-
cessful when it comes to solving the problems that led to their creation in the first place. 
Regimes that produce striking results at the level of outcomes can generate unintended 
side effects that offset or even swamp the progress they bring about in terms of curbing 
or redirecting the behavior giving rise to the problem to be solved. For example, it is dif-
ficult to provide a clear assessment of the effectiveness of a regime for the management 
of fish or marine mammals that succeeds only by shifting the attention of harvesters 
from one area or one species to another.
38
 
Social Practices 
Institutionalization enhances effectiveness. To be more specific, an important finding 
emerging from studies of effectiveness concerns the relationship between institutional 
arrangements in the narrow sense and the social practices that grow up around them. Re-
gimes as such are sets of rules, decisionmaking procedures, and programs. But every 
successful regime gives rise to an encompassing social practice in which the members 
themselves become enmeshed in an increasingly complex web of interactive relation-
ships and in which a variety of actors with no formal roles in the regime emerge as play-
ers. It is the growth of a vibrant social practice that typically legitimizes a regime in the 
thought processes of various actors, fleshes out the constitutive provisions of a regime 
with a range of important informal understandings, transforms the rules of a regime into 
standard operating procedures, and gives rise to an informal but attentive community of 
actors interested in the success of the regime and prepared to function as watchdogs 
keeping track of its performance.
39
 Our present understanding of the connections be-
tween regimes in the narrow sense and social practices is quite limited. But it is already 
clear that the way forward will involve a sustained effort to integrate insights drawn 
from the institutionalism of economics, which typically focuses on regimes in the narrow 
sense, and the institutionalism of sociology, which tends to direct attention to the charac-
ter of social practices.
40
  
Recently, we have become aware that civil society exists at the international level just as 
it does at the domestic level.
41
 Construed as a network of social connections that exists 
above the level of the individual (or the individual state in international society) and be-
low the level of the state (or the assemblage of governance systems in international soci-
ety), civil society provides much of the social glue that holds governance systems to-
gether and allows them to operate effectively in a wide range of social settings.
42
 Large 
challenges face those who seek to understand the role of civil society as a backdrop for 
the functioning of specific governance systems. It is difficult to find ways to pin down 
this concept for purposes of empirical analysis in any setting, much less to develop test-
able hypotheses about the role of civil society. Without doubt, these analytic challenges 
are even greater at the international or global level than at the domestic level. Yet it 
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seems increasingly clear that the costs of ignoring the role of civil society as a determi-
nant of the effectiveness of environmental regimes—or international institutions more 
generally—will be great.  
Institutional Linkages  
Links to other regimes can cut both ways in terms of their impact on effectiveness. Until 
recently, students of international regimes exhibited a marked tendency to treat these en-
tities as stand-alone arrangements and to conduct detailed case studies focused on indi-
vidual regimes. Given the relative difficulty in grasping the concept of regimes and the 
complexity of specific arrangements, this practice is perhaps understandable. But with 
the increase in numbers of environmental regimes in international society, this procedure 
is no longer tenable. Institutional linkages are widespread, and they clearly make a dif-
ference in terms of the effectiveness of individual regimes. It is helpful to begin by draw-
ing a distinction between horizontal linkages and vertical linkages. Horizontal linkages 
refer to connections between individual regimes and other institutional arrangements op-
erating at the level of international society. Some observers have been struck by the dan-
gers of individual regimes interfering with one another’s operations in ways that reduce 
effectiveness; they have begun to speak of institutional overlap or congestion as a label 
for this phenomenon.
43
 But the prospect of mutual reinforcement and other more positive 
connections seems equally important. This has given rise to an examination of nested re-
gimes, as in the case of links between regional seas arrangements and the overarching 
law of the sea; clustered regimes, as in the case of the linked but differentiable compo-
nents of the Antarctic Treaty System; and embedded regimes, as in the case of free trade 
arrangements embodying larger principles of the neo-liberal economic order.
44
 It has 
also led to a consideration of structures of institutional arrangements and an examination 
of similarities and differences in structures of environmental institutions in contrast to 
economic institutions.
45
 
Vertical linkages refer to connections between international regimes and institutional ar-
rangements operating at lower levels of social organization. Many students of domestic 
institutions have observed that arrangements devised at the national level produce better 
results when they are compatible with regional or local practices than when they work at 
cross purposes with these practices. Studies of local arrangements centered on the use of 
common pool resources, for example, are replete with accounts of the disruptive conse-
quences of national arrangements devised in ignorance of longstanding local procedures 
for ‘governing the commons.’
46
 The importance of these linkages is all the more impor-
tant at the international level, where compatibility across several levels of social organi-
zation becomes an issue. Much of the criticism that has been leveled at the international 
regime for trade, currently embodied in the World Trade Organization, for instance, cen-
ters on claims pertaining to the destructive or exploitative impacts these global arrange-
ments are alleged to have on the viability of longstanding resource regimes operating at 
regional and even local levels.
47
 Our knowledge of such matters remains relatively su-
perficial at this stage. But we already know enough to say that there is a need to devote 
much more attention to institutional linkages in future efforts to understand the sources 
of regime effectiveness. 
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Broader Setting 
Regimes are highly sensitive to the larger settings within which they operate. Interna-
tional environmental regimes do not operate in a socioeconomic or biophysical vacuum. 
Rather, they arise and operate in settings that have obvious implications for their capac-
ity to succeed in solving specific problems. Periods marked by economic recessions or 
depressions, for example, are likely to pose severe problems for efforts to solve envi-
ronmental problems. The existence of political tensions or the occurrence of hostilities 
among key players exogenous to the environmental problems at hand are apt to over-
shadow efforts to solve environmental problems. Consider the extent to which broader 
political problems impede efforts to devise effective regimes for international rivers in 
areas such as the Middle East or the Indian subcontinent.
48
 At the same time, there is 
much that we do not understand well in this area. Is regime effectiveness a function of 
the extent to which members have similar or homogeneous domestic political systems, 
and does it matter whether these systems are democratic in some meaningful sense of 
that term? Do regimes work better when their members have what are known as ‘strong’ 
states in terms of state-society relations?
49
 Can effective regimes arise in situations in 
which their creators are motivated more by political concerns than by a desire to solve 
environmental problems as such? Are there ways to immunize regimes dealing with spe-
cific problems from fluctuations in broader political and economic relations among their 
members? 
With regard to environmental regimes more specifically, it is critical to consider the rela-
tionships between the institutional arrangements themselves and the character of the eco-
systems to which they relate. It is easy to speak, in general terms, about the need for 
congruence between regime features and ecosystem attributes. But what does this mean 
in practice? Some answers to this question are beginning to emerge.
50
 The more resilient 
an ecosystem is, for instance, the less important it is to create monitoring mechanisms 
that can track changes in the system quickly and sensitively. The greater the homogene-
ity of the ecosystem, the less need there is for tailoring the components of a regime to the 
specific characteristics of the various subsystems that make up the overarching biophysi-
cal system. At the same time, it is clear that improving our understanding of the fit be-
tween ecosystems and institutional arrangements is a growth area in which the case is 
strong for investing resources intended to upgrade our ability to explain and predict the 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes.
51
 
In closing this section, let me step back and endeavor to put these comments about the 
various sources of regime effectiveness into perspective. There is little doubt that re-
gimes matter in the sense that they play a causal role in determining the content of col-
lective outcomes at the international level. By itself, however, this observation is of lim-
ited interest. What makes the study of regime effectiveness both complex and challeng-
ing is the fact that institutions constitute only one of a set of social drivers that typically 
interact with one another as determinants of collective outcomes at the international level 
and that assume different values in individual cases. This makes it difficult to separate 
out the role of various categories of drivers and to assess just what proportion of the 
variance in collective outcomes is attributable to institutional arrangements in contrast to 
other factors such as material conditions and ideas.
52
 It greatly reduces the prospects that 
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we can construct simple generalizations about the role of institutions couched in the form 
of statements specifying necessary or sufficient conditions for success in problem solv-
ing. And it raises questions about the extent to which it is helpful to treat some social 
drivers as underlying forces and others as intervening variables.
53
 None of this means 
that international regimes are of only marginal significance when it comes to solving en-
vironmental problems at the international level. But it does mean that future efforts to 
gain ground in understanding the effectiveness of international regimes must tackle mul-
tivariate relationships head on and anticipate the prospect that the same factors, such as 
problem structure or regime attributes, that loom large under some conditions will pro-
duce no more than marginal effects under other conditions. 
4. The Road Ahead  
How can we go about improving our understanding of regime effectiveness? The answer 
depends, in part, on the objectives we are seeking to achieve. Our current understanding 
of effectiveness constitutes a good start toward illuminating this complex phenomenon. 
What is more, studies that pertain in one way or another to this subject constitute a 
growth industry among those interested both in international institutions and in environ-
mental governance.
54
 Yet from the point of view of learning how to design environ-
mental regimes that have a reasonable prospect of solving the problems that motivate 
their creation, we have a long way to go. We know enough already, for instance, not to 
overlook matters of compliance in efforts to solve collaboration problems or to ignore 
problems of flexibility and learning in dealing with biophysical systems whose dynamics 
are poorly understood. But this is hardly sufficient to support a robust and reasonably 
successful effort to engage in institutional design in the realm of environmental govern-
ance.
55
 Assuming that this line of inquiry is concerned not only with understanding envi-
ronmental problems as an end in itself but also with solving them, how should we pro-
ceed?  
In responding to this question, it is helpful to begin by drawing a distinction between two 
streams of analysis that merit sustained attention during the next phase of research on the 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes. One stream features an effort to 
consolidate and refine the existing body of ideas about effectiveness; the other calls for 
an effort to break new ground and, in so doing, to shift this field of study onto a higher 
level of understanding.
56
 Much that we have learned about effectiveness is tentative or 
soft in nature. This is partly because many of the relationships in question have not been 
formulated with sufficient precision to allow for rigorous testing. We know that certain 
simple propositions about effectiveness, such as the notion that a dominant actor or a he-
gemon is necessary for regimes to prove successful, are not valid.
57
 But this hardly li-
censes the conclusion that power in the structural or material sense is unimportant in ac-
counting for the effectiveness of specific regimes.
58
 What we need in this connection is a 
definition of power that is easy to operationalize, that avoids the pitfalls of circular rea-
soning, and that can be used in efforts to test a battery of specific hypotheses about the 
links between power and effectiveness.
59
 Similar comments are in order about the role of 
epistemic communities in the operation of environmental regimes.
60
 Clearly, the idea of 
epistemic communities has struck a responsive chord in the thinking of many observers 
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of environmental regimes, and it is relatively easy to point to specific cases in which 
groups exhibiting some of the characteristics of epistemic communities appear to have 
made a difference.
61
 Yet the concept of an epistemic community has proven to be elusive 
when it comes to systematic empirical assessments. Observers frequently find them-
selves disagreeing not so much about the roles that epistemic communities play in actual 
cases as about whether or not we can say with certainty that an epistemic community is 
present. And these are not isolated examples. On the contrary, they exemplify a common 
problem plaguing efforts to turn interesting insights into a core of established proposi-
tions about the factors that determine the effectiveness of environmental regimes. 
Where propositions have been spelled out with sufficient precision to allow for testing, 
moreover, we commonly discover that we are dealing with contingent relationships. It is 
relatively easy to disprove many—perhaps most—propositions about effectiveness 
stated as invariant relationships (that is, statements purporting to identify necessary or 
sufficient conditions for the achievement of effectiveness).62 The presence of a dominant 
actor is not always critical to the achievement of effectiveness. The use of decision rules 
that call for consensus or even unanimity does not always pose a problem for effective-
ness. Uncertainty is not invariably a pitfall that needs to be mitigated or even eliminated 
altogether in the interests of achieving effectiveness. Yet none of this means that we can 
dismiss factors such as the distribution of power among regime members, the nature of 
decision rules, and the state of knowledge about the problem at stake in our efforts to 
understand the determinants of effectiveness. What is needed is an effort to formulate a 
body of contingent propositions about such matters or, in other words, statements that 
both specify links and spell out as explicitly as possible the conditions or combinations 
of conditions under which these propositions can be expected to hold. Only in this way 
can we turn interesting speculation into usable knowledge about effectiveness.  
These tasks of consolidation and refinement constitute a large and challenging research 
agenda for those interested in the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. 
We have made significant progress toward defining effectiveness, and taken some initial 
steps toward understanding the sources of effectiveness. With sufficient effort, this line 
of reasoning can yield a core of firmly established propositions that are useful to those 
responsible for designing or operating regimes. Impressive as it would be, however, this 
accomplishment would provide us with only a limited ability to make constructive con-
tributions to the design and operation of effective environmental regimes. We need to 
extend and even redirect the study of effectiveness, to build on our initial accomplish-
ments in order to move to a higher level of understanding of the sources of effectiveness.  
Most students of effectiveness focus on states as the formal members of regimes and 
proceed to construct models in which these actors are treated as unitary and self-
interested utility maximizers.
63
 This procedure is a useful point of departure; additional 
insights may well flow from further work with such models. But to move forward in this 
field, we need to relax these behavioral assumptions in a controlled manner and to com-
pare and contrast the insights that flow from a suite of differentiable models in contrast 
to a single stylized model. Three distinct steps seem particularly important to under-
standing the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. To begin with, we 
need to explore alternatives to utility maximization as sources of the behavior of regime 
members. This involves opening up this research program to what sociologists such as 
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Richard Scott call the normative and cognitive pillars of social institutions, and supple-
menting the logical rigor of economic models with the empirical insights of sociological 
analyses of institutions in the process.
64
 A second step turns on relaxing the unitary actor 
assumption embedded in many behavioral models in this field of study. This leads to a 
consideration of what Robert Putnam and others have characterized as the logic of two-
level games, a perspective that highlights bargaining over the terms of international re-
gimes among different factions at the domestic level.
65
  
The third step extends the analysis to include roles played by various nonstate actors in 
determining the effectiveness of environmental regimes.
66
 Because most environmental 
regimes involve a two-step process in which states are the formal members but it is the 
behavior of a variety of other actors (such as corporations or even individual consumers) 
that actually causes the problems under consideration, those interested in international 
environmental regimes have recently directed attention to the efforts of states to imple-
ment commitments made at the international level as they apply to the behavior of pri-
vate or semi-private actors operating under their jurisdiction.67 But it is increasingly clear 
that nonstate actors, such as the DeBeers Corporation in the case of diamonds, the Chi-
cago Board of Trade in the case of commodities, or Lloyds of London in the case of ma-
rine insurance, can become major players in international environmental regimes. There 
are even regimes of some significance in which states are not among the major players.68 
Needless to say, relaxing all these assumptions at once is a recipe for theoretical confu-
sion. Yet we cannot hope to make a successful transition to the next level of understand-
ing regarding the sources of regime effectiveness while we remain unwilling to modify 
conventional models that assume all the important actors are states that can be treated as 
unitary and rational utility maximizers. 
Quite apart from these underlying theoretical concerns regarding actors and the sources 
of their behavior, there are a number of analytic issues that require attention in the next 
wave of studies of regime effectiveness. The preceding discussion made it clear that ad-
vancing our understanding of the effectiveness of regimes will require an analysis of 
multivariate relationships. In itself, this conclusion is unremarkable; similar observations 
are in order regarding many social phenomena. In the case at hand, however, severe lim-
its on the use of most forms of statistical inference pose a major challenge. This is not to 
say that there is no place for inductive reasoning in the next phase of research on effec-
tiveness. Several projects that apply such reasoning to good effect have recently been 
completed.
69
 But this situation does lead to the conclusion that we need to engage in a 
sustained effort to understand the causal mechanisms or behavioral pathways through 
which regimes affect the behavior of various actors and, in the process, shape the content 
of collective outcomes in international society. Like other social institutions, regimes are 
not actors in their own right. Accordingly, they can affect the content of collective out-
comes only by influencing the behavior of regime members or other relevant actors. 
How do they do this? One attempt to answer this question adopts a broadly utilitarian 
perspective and directs attention to what have become known as the three ‘Cs.’ Thus, re-
gimes can increase the concern of relevant actors about the issues at stake, improve the 
contractual environment in the issue area, and enhance the capacity of key actors to carry 
out the terms of constitutional contracts.
70
 Another important study seeks to expand the 
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range of behavioral mechanisms considered. It looks at regimes as utility modifiers, en-
hancers of Cupertino, bestowers of authority, learning facilitators, role definers, and 
agents of internal realignment.
71
 Clearly, these studies constitute no more than prelimi-
nary forays into a complex subject. But they do point the way toward an important line 
of inquiry for students of regime effectiveness. Given the constraints on the use of induc-
tive procedures, one way to proceed is to focus more attention on tracing the causal 
chains through which institutional arrangements impact the behavior of various actors 
and through such impacts affect the content of collective outcomes in international soci-
ety. Among other things, this line of thinking is likely to prove particularly helpful to 
those concerned with practical matters of institutional design. 
Whether the focus is on consolidation and refinement or on extension and redirection, 
those seeking to improve our understanding of the effectiveness of environmental re-
gimes must come to grips with some important methodological problems. The most 
critical of these is undoubtedly the need to develop reliable and harmonized data sets that 
are easily accessible to those desiring to explore a variety of hypotheses dealing with the 
sources of institutional effectiveness. The current practice of relying on stand-alone case 
studies in which an individual regime is the unit of analysis has served us well; there is 
certainly room for more work of this kind in the pursuit of knowledge about effective-
ness. Yet during the next phase a critical need will be a capacity to subject both specific 
hypotheses about determinants of effectiveness and alternative models of the role of re-
gimes to systematic empirical examination based on evidence drawn from sizable num-
bers of cases.
72
 Does the nature of the decision rules employed by environmental re-
gimes make a difference in terms of effectiveness? What is the connection between the 
establishment of noncompliance procedures and effectiveness? Is the presence of non-
state actors among a regime’s members significant when it comes to the achievement of 
effectiveness?  
Answering questions of this type calls for the development of a database containing 
comparable information on as large a number of individual regimes as possible. The 
construction of such a database is an expensive proposition that is difficult to justify to 
funding agencies as an end in itself. Once in place, however, this database could become 
a public good available to all members of the relevant research community on conven-
ient terms. Starting in 1993, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) supported an effort to develop an International Regimes Database (IRD) as part 
of its project on the Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Commitments.
73
 At this juncture, the IRD is still under construction, having outlived the 
IIASA project that gave birth to it, and it has found material support from other 
sources.
74
 If my argument in this section is correct, the research community concerned 
with regime effectiveness has a compelling need for the continued development of the 
IRD or some reasonable facsimile thereof. 
The research strategies outlined above offer no guarantee that we will succeed in devel-
oping a substantial collection of established propositions about the determinants of re-
gime effectiveness. Much like the study of global warming, the theoretical, analytic, and 
methodological challenges facing students of effectiveness are great. But research in this 
field also resembles the study of climate change in the sense that the need for improved 
understanding is compelling and in that the problems of formulating useful answers are 
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worthy of the attention of the best and brightest analysts interested in international envi-
ronmental issues. We have already made real progress in this field. But much remains to 
be done in order to arrive at results that will prove helpful to policymakers in a general 
way, much less serve as a useful guide for focused efforts in the realm of institutional 
design. Here, as elsewhere, the prizes will go to those who succeed in finding ways to 
overcome barriers involving causal inferences and to relax problematic assumptions em-
bedded in current models without incurring undue losses of analytical rigor. 
5. Conclusion 
Since this essay is itself a survey of ongoing work pertaining to regime effectiveness, 
there is no need to summarize the contents of the preceding sections. But one point de-
serves special attention in these concluding paragraphs. What we can realistically hope 
for in this realm is an ability to act like physicians who develop superb diagnostic skills, 
rather than like chefs who are very good at following recipes. Although variations are 
certainly possible, recipes are expected to produce satisfactory results with a high degree 
of predictability and under a wide range of specific circumstances. In effect, they rest on 
a collection of statements spelling out sufficient conditions to transform collections of 
ingredients into finished products. The diagnostician, on the other hand, knows that there 
is a long list of factors that may play a role in explaining the condition of individual pa-
tients and that diagnoses based on necessary or sufficient conditions are few and far be-
tween. It is frequently possible to frame contingent or ceteris paribus propositions re-
garding the impacts of various factors and to observe complex interactions among a 
number of factors that are in play with regard to specific cases. But the role of the diag-
nostician is not to follow simple recipes that will ensure the health of individual patients. 
Rather, he or she must build up a convincing interpretation of each individual case based 
on considering a variety of factors that taken together appear to account for the condition 
at hand. The prescription then follows from this interpretive account.  
Applied to international environmental regimes, these comments suggest that we should 
never expect to solve complex problems through applications of simple recipes. What 
works in dealing with marine systems may not work with atmospheric or terrestrial sys-
tems. What makes sense in dealing with both ecosystems and social systems that are 
highly resilient may not work with systems that are vulnerable to nonlinear changes. 
What proves effective in cases where the behavior of the relevant systems is well under-
stood may not work in cases where our understanding of this behavior is limited and sub-
ject to rapid change. None of this is to suggest that analyses of the sources of institu-
tional effectiveness have nothing to contribute to the initial design or subsequent modifi-
cation of international environmental regimes. But it does suggest that the most useful 
contributions of regime analysis to solving large–scale environmental problems will take 
the form of interpretive accounts based on efforts to join general knowledge with an in-
depth understanding of individual cases, in contrast to the application of simple recipes 
to complex problems of international governance. 
An earlier version of this article was delivered at the annual meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 14 February 1998. 
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Appendix II 
The Study of Regime Effectiveness 
Agenda-Setting Paper for the Concerted Action Workshop, 16-18 October, 1998 
Arild Underdal, with contributions from Matthijs Hisschemöller, and Konrad von 
Moltke 
1. Purpose and scope 
The purpose of this short paper is to identify a set of common and important cutting-edge 
questions that can serve as agenda items for the Concerted Action programme. In this ef-
fort we build on several excellent state-of-the-art reviews covering regime analysis more 
generally (notably Levy, Young and Zürn, 1995; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 
1997; and Young, 1998a). This paper is not another comprehensive assessment; we as-
sume that at least one of the reviews mentioned above is known to all participants. Our 
ambition here is limited to providing a framework for a focused discussion of Concerted 
Action priorities without in any way closing the agenda. We try to do so by delineating a 
set of general and fundamental questions that any study of regime effectiveness will have 
to wrestle with and that the field at large tries to answer. We invite you to read the paper 
with a view to exploring how your own work relates to one or more of these questions, 
and to use it as a framework for identifying important gaps or thinking about future pri-
orities and research strategies.  
2. The dependent variable: defining and measuring ‘effectiveness’  
International regimes may be evaluated by a range of different standards, including ef-
fectiveness, efficiency, fairness/equity, robustness, and legitimacy. In this Concerted Ac-
tion programme we have focused on ‘effectiveness’. A good place to start may therefore 
be to pose two questions about our dependent variable: (i) what precisely do we mean by 
‘regime effectiveness’? and (ii) how can we go about measuring the ‘effectiveness’ of an 
international environmental regime?  
As a first cut, an international regime can be considered ‘effective’ to the extent that it 
successfully performs a particular (set of) function(s) or solves the problem(s) that moti-
vated its establishment. Although useful as a point of departure it soon becomes clear 
that this definition is not sufficiently precise to serve as an operational tool in compara-
tive empirical research. Even though important progress has been made over the past 
several years, more conceptual groundwork is needed to sharpen our definition(s) of ‘ef-
fectiveness’ and even more so to develop strategies and tools for measurement. More 
precisely, there seems to be at least three basic questions that students of regime effec-
tiveness will have to address: (1) What precisely constitutes the object to be assessed? 
(2) Against which standard(s) is this object to be evaluated? (3) What kinds of meas-
urement operations do we have to go through in order to be able to attribute a certain 
score to a particular regime? 
The first of these questions may at first thought appear trivial: clearly the object must be 
the regime in focus! Although correct in itself, this answer is not particularly helpful. A 
regime can be evaluated on the basis of the norms, principles and rules constituting its 
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substantive contents (output, in the terminology of Easton (1965)), or on the basis of the 
consequences flowing from the implementation of and adaptation to these norms and 
rules. Whenever we are dealing with environmental regimes, the latter may be further 
specified by making a distinction between influence on human behaviour (outcome) and 
consequences for the state of the biophysical environment itself (impact). Presumably, 
the latter is our ultimate concern, but impact on the environment can in many instances 
be assessed only years or even decades after the regulations were established. In the 
meanwhile the best we can do is to focus on one of the preceding stages.  
 
Output   Outcome     Impact  
Norms, rules,  
regulations, etc. 
 Change in (targeted) 
behaviour 
 Change in biophysical 
environment 
Figure 1 Environmental Regimes as Objects of Assessment 
The score we would assign to a particular regime may well depend on which of these 
foci we adopt. A regime that appears ‘effective’ judged on the basis of its formal rules 
and regulations may turn out to affect human behaviour only marginally or in unex-
pected directions. Moreover, if the problem diagnosis on which the regime is premised is 
inaccurate, even a regime that succeeds well in changing human behaviour as intended 
may fail to lead to the improvement expected in the state of the environment. Thus, regu-
lations successfully reducing emissions of SO2 will affect the health of forests or water-
ways only to the extent that the environmental damage we want to prevent is indeed 
caused by SO2 emissions. Most studies of regime effectiveness seem to focus on behav-
ioural change, which can be seen as the intermediate link between policy and the envi-
ronment.4 The general notion of effectiveness is, however, open to different inter-
pretations. The basic implication of this ambiguity is simply that we need to specify ex-
plicitly and carefully what our effectiveness scores refer to – the principal options being 
formal rules and regulations, actual change in human behaviour, or change in the state of 
the environment itself. 
Most assessments of regime effectiveness also seem to focus on ‘gross’ rather than ‘net’ 
achievement, leaving out the transaction costs involved in establishing and operating the 
regime.5 Moreover, most assessments seem to focus on problem-solving in a rather nar-
row sense, leaving out various kinds of side effects generated by the formation or opera-
                                                   
4
  One reason why political scientists tend to focus on outcomes is that a regime that succeeds in 
changing human behaviour as intended has achieved its first order objective and hence can be 
considered effective in terms of governing society. If it still falls short of achieving its ulti-
mate objective, that failure must be attributed to deficiencies in ‘knowledge-making’ rather 
than in policy-making. Political science is concerned (primarily) with the latter. 
5
  Besides, there seems to be a widespread inclination to build in an implicit assumption that the 
worst that a regime can accomplish is nothing (=zero effectiveness). It is abundantly clear, 
however, that there is a very real possibility that a regime may have a negative effect – even 
before we include transaction costs in the equation. By implication, our scales will have to al-
low for negative scores. The need to look more carefully at negative regime effects is under-
lined in i.e. Ringius (1997) and Miles et al. (forthcoming). 
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tion of regimes. We see nothing inherently wrong in these conceptualisations, as long as 
their implications are clearly understood. We should realise, though, that neglecting 
transaction costs is likely to lead us to overestimate the social benefits produced by a re-
gime, while leaving out side-effects probably by and large leads to the opposite bias. A 
comprehensive assessment of the net social benefits generated by a particular regime 
(Ei), including the efforts to establish and operate it, would require that we solve some-
thing like the equation below: 
 
 Ei = (Si . Ki) + Bi – Ci 
where:  
Si = the stringency of regime rules and regulations (output); 
Ki = the level of compliance with these provisions; 
Bi = side effects of regime formation and operation; and 
Ci = the transaction costs of these processes. 
 
Moreover, a comprehensive research agenda would include efforts to examine the rela-
tionship between or among some of these components. For example, except for regimes 
dealing with (pure) co-ordination problems, we may – ceteris paribus – expect the level 
of compliance to decline as regime rules and regulations become more ‘demanding’ (see 
Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996). Other things being equal we may furthermore ex-
pect transaction costs to be higher for a demanding regime than for regimes that are 
closer to ‘the non-co-operative equilibrium’. A cynic might even argue that aggregate net 
benefits tend to be constant (and, even worse: close to zero)6; whatever is gained at the 
regime formation stage in terms of more ambitious rules or targets tend to be offset by a 
lower level of compliance and higher transaction costs!  
To assign a score of effectiveness to a particular regime, we need a point (or trajectory) 
of reference against which actual achievement can be compared. At the most general 
level there seems to be two basic alternatives (Underdal, 1992). One is the hypothetical 
state of affairs that would have come about had the regime not existed. Adopting this 
point of reference we would conceive of effectiveness in terms of (relative) improve-
ment. This is clearly the notion we have in mind when considering whether a regime 
‘matters’. The other option is to evaluate a regime against some idea of what constitutes 
the ‘ideal’ solution (the ‘collective optimum’). This is the appropriate standard if we 
want to know to what extent a problem is in fact ‘solved’ under the present arrange-
ments. The two notions can easily be combined, as suggested by Helm and Sprinz 
(1998). Their formula conceives of effectiveness in terms of the extent to which a regime 
has in fact accomplished all that could be accomplished:  
 
                                                   
6
  A well-known Norwegian economist ‘derived’ what is sometimes referred to as the ‘iron law 
of bargaining’, saying that inherent in the process of bargaining are mechanisms that tend to 
block or spoil the joint gains that it is intended to tap (Johansen, 1979). 
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 regime solution – non-co-operative outcome 
 optimal solution – non-co-operative outcome  
 
Determining the non-co-operative outcome or the optimal solution poses intriguing 
methodological challenges. In a non-experimental real-world setting the question of what 
would have happened in the absence of a regime can be answered only through counter-
factual reasoning. Conventional approaches include extrapolating current trends or tak-
ing the situation that existed immediately before the regime took effect as the baseline, 
but both methods are fraught with problems and pitfalls. Determining the collective op-
timum – the maximum that could have been accomplished – is usually even more diffi-
cult. In some cases, notably for regimes designed to manage living resources, we may be 
fortunate enough to find explicit expert advice that we take as a point of departure. Most 
often, however, the expert assessments available to us do not exist in a standardised 
‘ready for use’ format. Moreover, particularly for issues characterised by conflict over 
values, the task of determining the ‘optimal’ solution cannot be reduced to a purely tech-
nical exercise such as estimating the maximum sustainable yield of a particular stock. 
Thus, the key issue occupying the International Whaling Commission is not how much 
the various whale stocks can take but rather whether or not it is morally wrong to kill 
whales for human consumption regardless of stock abundance. Judging a regime by its 
performance in accomplishing its own officially declared purpose is probably the best 
way of hedging against completely arbitrary standards based on the observer’s own ideas 
about what is good and bad. We should nonetheless realise that whenever the purpose it-
self is contested any assessment of effectiveness is likely to be equally controversial, at 
least on normative grounds. 
Finally, any assessment of effectiveness implies a causal inference.7 When we say that a 
particular regime is ‘effective’ we attribute some consequence(s) to the existence or 
functioning of that regime. In most cases human behaviour and the state of the environ-
ment are subject to the influence of a wide range of other factors as well. To give just 
one example, a reduction in the emission of certain pollutants may well be caused by 
technological development, changes in relative prices of products or input factors, or by 
economic recession. Separating the impact of a regime from the impact of such ‘exoge-
nous’ developments is often a very difficult task, in part because the regime may interact 
with exogenous factors. For students of regime effectiveness there is, however, no es-
cape. We therefore need to think hard about methodological approaches and techniques 
that can help us make sensible and reliable inferences about cause-effect relationships.  
For purposes of systematic comparative or statistical research, conceptual congruence 
and inter-calibration of measurement methods are important requirements. For the field 
at large, however, any attempt at authorising one particular conceptual framework or one 
method of measurement would, at least at this stage, be a futile and doomed exercise. A 
more sensible and realistic objective seems to be to work together to enhance precision 
and transparency so that we can at least distinguish substantive from terminological or 
technical differences. A critical examination of work completed or in progress from this 
perspective might help us see more clearly where we ‘agree’ and where we ‘disagree’, 
                                                   
7
  This applies at least in so far as the assessment refers to outcome or impact. 
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and – perhaps – also help us learn from what seem to be particularly promising ap-
proaches.  
3. Independent variables: what determines regime effectiveness? 
Why are some international regimes more effective than others? At the most general 
level, there seems to be two basic answers. One seeks the explanation in characteristics 
of the problem addressed, the basic proposition being that some problems are intellectu-
ally less complicated or politically more ‘benign’ than others and hence easier to solve. 
The main research challenges are (a) to specify what exactly makes a problem difficult 
or easy to solve, and (b) to determine how much difference variance in problem type 
makes with regard to regime effectiveness. The other path focuses on the ‘supply side’, 
more precisely on the capacity of a system to ‘solve’ various kinds of problems. The 
general argument is that some problem-solving efforts are more successful than others 
because more potent tools are being used or because the problem is attacked with greater 
skill or energy. The challenges here are (a) to specify what determine problem-solving 
‘capacity’, and (b) to explore how much of the variance in effectiveness can be attributed 
to variance in ‘capacity’.      
3.1 Type of problem 
Several problem typologies have been suggested in previous research. Hasenclever, 
Mayer and Rittberger (1997) sort these contributions into two broad categories, one fo-
cusing on the basic contents of issues or issue-areas, the other on more specific configu-
rations of preferences in collective action situations (see below).8  
 
‘Problem structure’ ‘Situation structure’ 
• Substantive problem-areas characterised in 
terms of the basic value at stake, such as secu-
rity, economic well-being, etc. (Ex.: Czem-
piel, 1981) 
• Objects of contention. (Ex.: Rittberger et al., 
cf. Rittberger, 1993) 
• The degree of congruity between individual 
and collective costs and/or benefits (Ex.: Un-
derdal, 1987; Miles et al., forthcoming) 
• Applies game theory models to distinguish 
different kinds of collective action situations 
(Ex. Stein, 1982; Zürn, 1992) 
 
 
Several observations can be made about this path of research. First, even though no 
straightforward method exists for translating one of these typologies into another, we can 
easily see that they are related. The main common denominator is that they all conceive 
of regime formation and effectiveness as a function of the kind of values or configura-
tions of interests.9 In other words, they agree that the values or interests at stake provide 
important clues for understanding international co-operation. They diverge, however, 
                                                   
8
  This is by no means an exhaustive typology. In addition, we have some interesting studies fo-
cusing on what we might call ‘intellectual’ aspects (such as the amount of uncertainty pertain-
ing to problem diagnosis and the effects of alternative ‘cures’), or on the interface between 
‘intellectual’ and ‘political’ dimensions (see i.e. Hisschemöller and Gupta, forthcoming). 
9
  This is the defining characteristic of the so-called ’interest-based ’approach. 
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when it comes to conceptualisation and taxonomies. Second, research examining the sig-
nificance of problem or situation characteristics has generated a set of relatively precise 
propositions. Game theory offers the most precise models and the most conclusive re-
sults, but also the approaches developed by i.e. the Tübingen and Oslo/Seattle ‘schools’ 
offer substantial guidance in linking problem types to outcomes. For example, the 
Tübingen ‘school’ distinguishes four basic ‘objects of contention’, and hypothesise that 
the prospects of co-operative solutions decline in the order indicated below: 
 
Conflict of interests pertaining to absolutely assessed goods  (1) 
Conflict over the means to obtain certain values  (2) 
Conflict of interests pertaining to relatively assessed goods (3) 
Conflict over values    (4) 
  
Third, empirical studies provide a fair amount of support not only for the underlying as-
sumption that problem type ‘matters’ but also for several of the more specific hypotheses 
that have been suggested (see i.e. Efinger, Mayer and Schwarzer, 1993; Andresen and 
Wettestad, 1995). In an overall assessment we can therefore at the very least conclude 
that, taken together, these various contributions demonstrate (1) that problem type is an 
important determinant of co-operative achivements and a promising focus of research, 
and (2) that at least some of the typologies developed discriminate reasonably well be-
tween problems that are easy and problems that are hard to solve. 
Having said that, we should recognise that a considerable amount of work needs to be 
done before we can claim to have a well-developed theory specifying precisely how par-
ticular problem characteristics affect international (environmental) co-operation. This 
Concerted Action programme could conceivably contribute on at least two fronts. First, 
more conceptual groundwork is needed to determine precisely where the various typolo-
gies overlap and differ in substantive contents. For example, it seems that the so-called 
‘problem-structural’ approaches on the one hand and ‘situation-structural’ schemes on 
the other operate at different levels of specificity. To the extent that this is the case, they 
can be seen as complementary rather than competing schemes – the former applying to 
broad categories of problems, the latter to more specific strategic choice situations. This 
line of reasoning suggests that we might be well advised to use schemes such as those 
developed by the Tübingen or the Oslo/Seattle team to describe the basic (incentive) 
structure of a problem and then move on to apply game theory models to analyse more 
well-defined strategic choice situations. The various typologies seem, however, to differ 
also in other respects. For example, they seem to be ‘situated’ in different research tradi-
tions. The ‘situation structure’ approach and that of the Oslo/Seattle team are clearly 
framed in terms of rational choice analysis, while those suggested by Czempiel and His-
schemöller & Gupta seem to be rooted in a ‘sociological’ perspective. To the extent that 
a particular taxonomy is embedded in a particular conception of agent-structure relation-
ships it may well function adequately only within that basic framework. The general 
point to be made here is simply that in order to be able to ‘couple’ propositions and find-
ings from the various projects we need to understand more precisely how the different 
schemes relate to each other. Again, the main purpose of such an exercise would be to 
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enhance precision and transparency and facilitate effective communication; we are not in 
the business of authorising one particular scheme as ‘the approved taxonomy’.  
Second, more systematic empirical research is needed to determine more precisely how 
variance in problem characteristics affect (the outcome of) regime formation and imple-
mentation processes, and good reasons can be given for treating these stages as different 
and sequentially coupled ‘games’ (Young, 1998b). More specifically, there are at least 
three different challenges to be met. One is to move from (largely) bivariate to more 
elaborate multivariate analysis. This is a critical step we need to take in order to be able 
to separate more reliably the impact of problem characteristics from the impact of other 
factors. Another is to explore in greater depth possibilities of interplay; i.e. try to deter-
mine to what extent and how problem characteristics and capacity components interact 
in shaping outcomes (see below). Third, if we are to succeed in taking these steps, we 
will have to expand our methodological repertoire in at least two directions: we shall 
have to supplement single-case studies with ‘larger-N’ studies, and supplement the pre-
vailing ‘historical’ mode of study with methods that permit us to undertake more sys-
tematic and transparent multivariate analysis.10 Taken together these challenges amount 
to a fairly demanding agenda!  
3.2 Capacity 
It seems fair to say that at this stage we know more about what makes a problem easy or 
difficult to solve than about what determines our ability or capacity to cope with it. In 
fact, the concept of ‘capacity’ is itself a rather elusive notion, used here only as a ‘con-
ceptual umbrella’ covering a wide range of ‘supply side’ factors. Any specific study can 
deal only with a subset of these factors. A good place to start may be by trying to iden-
tify the principal elements. When we begin to think about which elements to include we 
will, however, soon discover that ‘capacity’ can be determined only with reference to a 
particular category of functions or tasks. Different tasks to some extent require different 
capabilities and skills. Even worse: what serves as an important asset in one setting may 
well turn out to be counter-productive in another. Coercive power is a case in point. The 
upshot of all this is that ‘capacity’ is a very complex concept calling for careful specifi-
cation and inviting contingent and carefully contextualised statements only.  
Complexity should, however, not be accepted as a legitimate excuse for paralysis. Par-
ticularly for those of us who would like to think that research can generate knowledge 
that decision-makers can use as inputs for designing or negotiating international regimes, 
understanding what determines the ability of international society to cope with different 
kinds of problems should be a high priority item. Let us therefore take some time to con-
sider how we might approach the challenge of examining the political dimensions of 
problem-solving ‘capacity’.11 
 
                                                   
10
  Please note that we use the word supplement. We do believe that ’conventional’ single-case 
studies have a lot to offer; what we are saying is that for some analytical purposes we will 
need the distinctive contributions of other approaches as well. 
11
  The general notion of ’capacity’ includes also intellectual components that we do not explore 
in this paper. 
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This brings us back to the task of identifying the major determinants of capacity. A crude 
first cut may be to draw a distinction between endogenous and exogenous determinants. 
The former category includes characteristics of the regime itself and the institution 
through which it was established, the latter characteristics of the broader political, eco-
nomic and social setting in which the regime was formed and subsequently operates. As 
these formulations suggest, we will have to consider endogenous as well as exogenous 
factors in two different stages; the stage of regime formation and that of opera-
tion/implementation. The capacity formula may well have to be differentiated by stage 
(cf. Young, 1998b). 
3.2.1 Endogenous (institutional) factors  
What a regime accomplishes is to some extent dependent on its contents and form. In se-
quential order, the research challenges are to determine (1) how the institutional setting 
through which the regime was established influenced its contents and form, and (2) how 
its own substantive provisions and organisational set-up in turn affect its performance.  
The former challenge calls for efforts to study institutions as arenas and organisations as 
actors. Arenas regulate the access of actors to problems and the access of problems to 
decision opportunities (‘games’). Arenas differ in terms of, inter alia, rules of access, de-
cision rules, rules of procedure, and informal ‘culture’. One of the tasks before us is to 
examine how these rules and norms influence the process of regime formation. This 
process often takes place under the auspices and with the assistance of an international 
organisation, and the outcome may well be affected by official purpose as well as the 
structure and capabilities of that organisation.12 To qualify as an actor in its own right an 
organisation must have a minimum of unity, autonomy (vis-à-vis other actors, notably 
member states), resources, and external activity. International organisations vary sub-
stantially in terms of scores on these dimensions. One obvious candidate for a top score 
would be the EU. By contrast, most secretariats serving international environmental re-
gimes find themselves close to (and in some cases below) the critical minimum needed 
to be recognised as political actors. The general question raised by these observations 
may be formulated as follows: what difference does the actor capacity of the ‘sponsor-
ing’ organisation make for the formation of environmental regimes?13 
Similar questions can be raised with reference to the stage of implementation. Even well-
established global economic institutions, such as GATT and the proposed MAI are re-
markably sparse in terms of institutional instruments, particularly when seen in relation 
to the complexity of the problems they are established to cope with. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, many environmental regimes employ a much wider range of institutional mecha-
nisms to achieve their goals. There are good reasons to believe that the institutional in-
                                                   
12
  Just think about the divergent preferences concerning the role of GATT/WTO vs. UN organi-
sations such as UNCTAD and UNCED as arenas for negotiating global agreements affecting 
trade and investment as well as development and/or the environment. 
13
  Interest in organisational seems to be fairly low among students of international environ-
mental regimes. One reason may be that organisational variables are not considered important 
determinants of outcomes. Moreover, regime analysis developed to some degree as an attempt 
to move beyond what was seen by many as a somewhat sterile preoccupation with formal or-
ganisational arrangements. 
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strumentarium at disposal in the operation stage may be an important determinant of re-
gime performance.  
Once a regime is in place a host of new questions pertaining to substantive rules and 
regulations arise. For example, (under what circumstances) are regimes relying on regu-
lation by incentive more effective than those relying on regulation by directive? How 
important are various kinds of selective incentives or differentiation of obligations in en-
ticing reluctant states to join a regime and comply with its provisions? How does the le-
gal status of a regulation – or the existence of performance monitoring and review pro-
cedures – affect compliance? These and similar questions are studied in considerable 
depth in economics, law, and to some extent also political science. Good answers would 
be of great practical interest to decision-makers and stakeholders. At this stage it seems, 
however, fair to say that the answers we can provide are neither fully consistent nor suf-
ficiently well differentiated (and the former may in part be a consequence of the latter). 
It seems abundantly clear that many policy instruments work ‘well’ only in particular 
circumstances. Additional work is needed in order to specify those circumstances more 
precisely, and to come up with more sophisticated, contingent generalisations (see Efin-
ger, Mayer and Schwarzer, 1993). Hopefully, this Concerted Action programme can of-
fer a conducive, multidisciplinary setting for thinking about how we can stand up to this 
challenge.     
3.2.2 ‘Exogenous’ factors 
A host of ‘exogenous’ factors – notably characteristics of the political, economic or so-
cial system in which a regime is situated – influence its effectiveness. At least four of 
these seem to merit particular attention: the distribution of power among the Parties in-
volved, the amount of skill and energy available for ‘engineering’ co-operative solutions, 
the sense of ‘community’ within the system or group, and interplay with other institu-
tions.  
The distribution of power  
The more demanding the decision rule, the more critical becomes leadership of one kind 
or another. And the weaker the ‘systemic’ capacity for monitoring and enforcing compli-
ance, the more important becomes the power that one or a few Parties can mobilise in 
support of the regime. The common denominator for the so-called ‘power-based’ ap-
proaches is the assumption that the ‘strength’ of a regime depends on the extent to which 
it satisfies the interests of powerful actors. This line of reasoning led to what is known as 
the ‘hegemonic stability’ hypothesis, saying – in essence – that a ‘unipolar’ distribution 
of power, i.e. the existence of one dominant actor (‘hegemon’), is a necessary condition 
for the establishment and maintenance of effective international regimes. Recent re-
search has produced substantial empirical evidence indicating that this hypothesis is not 
tenable (see i.e. Young and Osherenko, 1993; Efinger, Mayer and Schwarzer, 1993). 
This conclusion should not, however, lead us to infer that the distribution of power is 
therefore irrelevant to regime effectiveness. Rather, the main implication seems to be 
that a more sophisticated analytical framework is needed to determine the impact of 
power. One step in that direction could be to link the distribution of power to the con-
figuration of interests. Intuitively, we would expect concentration of power in the hands 
of the ‘laggards’ to yield less ‘progressive’ and effective regimes than a similar concen-
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tration in the hands of the ‘pushers’. Preliminary results from the Miles et al. project 
strongly support this general hunch. Conceptualised in such terms the distribution of 
power in fact comes out as the most important determinant of effectiveness in dealing 
with politically ‘malign’ problems. Interestingly, the same study indicates that power is 
of little or no relevance in handling problems categorised as ‘benign’. 
Skill and energy 
Good solutions are rarely if ever simply ‘there’; they often have to be invented or de-
signed and then marketed or brokered to the Parties involved. The more skill and energy 
available for these tasks, the more likely it seems that they will be successful. Research 
on international co-operation provides ample support for the proposition that intellectual 
or entrepreneurial leadership can be a critical determinant of ‘success’ in international 
negotiations (see i.e. Young, 1991). At the same time, we should recognise that these 
modes of leadership are notoriously elusive (although fascinating) subjects of study, ide-
ally requiring in-depth empirical analysis of interaction that often takes place behind 
closed doors. This is probably one reason why we still have a long way to go before we 
can claim to understand well the sources, techniques, and significance of the intellectual 
and entrepreneurial modes of leadership. We surmise, though, that there may be a reser-
voir of interesting observations ‘hidden’ in disparate case-studies undertaken primarily 
to answer other questions. If we are right, this Concerted Action programme may pro-
vide opportunities for comparing notes and developing a strategy for tapping into this 
reservoir.  
Over the past ten to fifteen years several major studies have been published enhancing 
our understanding of the role of (consensual) knowledge as a basis for international co-
operation and of the role of transnational networks of experts (known as ‘epistemic 
communities’) in transforming (science-based) knowledge into premises for policy deci-
sions (E.Haas, 1990; P. Haas, 1990). Yet important questions call for further study. We 
know that science-based knowledge often plays an important role in policy-making pro-
cesses, not least in environmental affairs. We also know, however, that the process of 
transforming such knowledge into policy premises can be a very complex and delicate 
exercise, and that there is no straight path leading from scientific consensus on ‘facts’ to 
political consensus on action. The simple ‘enlightenment’ notion casting science in the 
role of the wise leading the blind is in important respects misleading (see i.e. Jasanoff, 
1990; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1997). The science-politics interface and the link between 
‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ are highly complex relationships that we do not yet understand 
well. Moreover, most of the previous research in this field focuses on the role of knowl-
edge and epistemic communities in regime formation. More work is needed to determine 
whether and to what extent the results reported for that stage can be extended also to re-
gime effectiveness.  
The sense of community 
One of the basic propositions of the ‘constructivist’ approach is that identity shapes pref-
erences (Wendt, 1992:398). Scholars working within other traditions concur that the 
strength of the sense of community (Gemeinschaft) within a group tends to affect it ca-
pacity for collective action. Several mechanisms seem to be at work here. Constructivists 
would emphasise the social construction of identity (the growth or strength of a sense of 
‘we-ness’). Rational choice scholars would point out that in stable and close relation-
Noordwijk Workshop  53
ships actors will be induced to adopt a long-term perspective (extend ‘the shadow of the 
future’) (i.e. Axelrod & Keohane, 1985), and shift from a specific to a more diffuse in-
terpretation of the norm of reciprocity (Keohane, 1986).  
The interest in community or identity as a basis for international co-operation leads di-
rectly to an interest in the role of civil society. A substantial amount of practical experi-
ence suggests that many environmental regimes at all levels of governance are dependent 
upon the active participation of societal actors such as industry and commerce, environ-
mental NGOs, and the media (see i.e. Lipschutz, 1996) In the study of international re-
gimes the role of civil society is, however, still a fairly new and underdeveloped field of 
research, calling for additional investment in conceptual groundwork to develop analytic 
tools and models as well as for more systematic empirical analysis.  
Interplay 
Most assessments of international regimes consider these institutions as stand-alone ar-
rangements. However, environmental regimes do not exist in a vacuum. For one thing, 
environmental damage most often occur as an unintended side-effect of other perfectly 
legitimate activities (such as industrial production, transportation of people and goods, 
etc.). In order to succeed, environmental policy must therefore somehow ‘penetrate’ 
those systems of activities that cause damage to the environment. Moreover, in some 
cases environmental regimes are deliberately ‘nested’ in the sense that one builds upon 
another. The general implication of these observations is that the effectiveness of a par-
ticular environmental regime will in many instances be heavily dependent upon activities 
managed by other regimes as well as upon the performance of these other institutions. As 
a consequence, many environmental regimes can be adequately understood only in a 
contextual perspective. Regime interplay thus represents an important – and hitherto also 
a somewhat neglected – subject of analysis.  
It is hardly feasible to include all linkages and relationships in an assessment of regime 
effectiveness (for an inventory, see Young, 1996). There seem, however, to be at least 
two types of relationships that merit particular attention. One might be referred to as the 
problem of ‘embeddedness’, the other is the relationship of international environmental 
regimes with regimes governing international economic activities. 
Many environmental regimes are embedded or nested in the sense that they form part of 
an institution whose goals are wider than those of environmental management or sus-
tainability. The regulations adopted and managed by the EU are probably the most obvi-
ous examples. In general, the effectiveness of an ‘embedded’ regime will at least to some 
degree depend upon the effectiveness of the institution to which it ‘belongs’.  
Most environmental regimes have economic impacts. As a consequence, conflicts be-
tween environmental regimes and economic regimes abound – ranging from the attempts 
to refocus the World Bank on sustainable development to the problems associated with 
structural adjustment programs sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank, to the in-
creasingly fraught relationship between trade and investment on the hand and environ-
mental quality on the other. Mapping these relationships and determining their signifi-
cance represent major challenges for any assessment of the effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes.  
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Taken together, these observations suggest not only that the effectiveness of an environ-
mental regime will in many instances depend on its relationships with other institutions; 
they also point towards a new front of research, where systems or complexes of interre-
lated institutions rather than individual regimes are in focus. It goes without saying that 
the task of assessing the ‘effectiveness’ of such institutional complexes confronts us with 
a host of new questions that students of international regimes have only began thinking 
seriously about. A substantial amount of conceptual groundwork may be needed before 
we have a solid platform for engaging in cumulative empirical research in this area.  
4. Regime domains: global, regional, EU 
This Concerted Action programme is designed to cover environmental regimes at three 
different levels: global, regional, and intra-EU. The basic assumption behind this set-up 
is that the three domains differ in important respects, and that additional mileage might 
be gained by systematically comparing these three categories with regard to variance in 
regime effectiveness and the mechanisms influencing their performance. 
The three domains differ in at least three important respects. One is with regard to the 
number and heterogeneity of Parties. A plausible assumption is that the larger the num-
ber of Parties and the greater the heterogeneity of the group the less likely that joint 
problem-solving efforts will be successful. Recent studies suggest, however, that there is 
more to be said about this question (see Keohane & Ostrom, 1995). Another important 
difference pertains to institutional capital in the form of i.e. decision rules facilitating 
collective action, the organisational capacity of secretariats and other bodies, etc. In this 
regard the EU clearly stands out as unique – because of its democratic basis, its decision 
rules, its financial instruments, its administrative apparatus, and its legal powers. A third 
area where we would expect to find significant differences is in the sense of community 
existing within the various groups of Parties. Here we would definitely expect global re-
gimes to obtain a low score, while the EU and some regional groupings aspire to a high 
score. Given the organisational set-up of our workshops and meetings, one challenge for 
the co-ordinating group will be to design procedures enabling us to compare notes across 
groups and thus systematically explore the impact of these and other differences for re-
gime effectiveness.  
5. Research strategies  
We end this paper with a couple of ecumenical remarks about ‘paradigms’ and methods. 
The study of international regimes draws upon at least two major strands of social sci-
ence theory; rational choice models of collective action and strategic interaction, and so-
cial-practice models rooted in sociology and social anthropology. In our view both of 
these traditions have important contributions to offer. By implication, we see no reason 
to engage in some kind of intellectual crusade on behalf of one or the other; clearly, nei-
ther provides the complete framework for understanding international institutions. At the 
same time, we should appreciate that their contributions are not only different, but to a 
significant degree also incommensurable, meaning that they cover different ‘domains’. 
This suggests that we should have modest ambitions for integrating the two approaches, 
and also that efforts at ‘forcing’ the insights of one upon the other (through the familiar 
‘but-you-have-not-considered-X’ kind of critique) will most often not be a particularly 
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productive exercise.14 This is, of course, not to say that learning cannot occur across 
paradigms, nor that theory elements from different paradigms can never be combined. 
The argument is simply that the fact that they are working from different basic assump-
tions, are focusing on different mechanisms, and use different analytic tools is exactly 
what enables each of them to offer insights that the other cannot provide. 
Finally, a plea for expanding our methodological repertoire. The study of international 
environmental regimes has in the past relied heavily on single-case studies, using the 
tools of ‘traditional’ qualitative analysis. This approach has generated very important in-
sights in the past, and is likely to continue to do so in the future. As the field develops, 
however, we will more often be able to formulate – and also be ‘forced’ to address – 
demanding questions that can be answered only through systematic multivariate analysis, 
directed at precisely formulated ‘strategic’ research questions (cf. Bernauer, 1995). 
Moreover, as an increasing number of good case studies becomes available, much can be 
said for investing more time and energy in comparative reviews of findings and hypothe-
ses. For these and other purposes we need to take advantage of a wider range of meth-
odological techniques, including also more ‘rigorous’ comparative designs, ‘large-N’ 
studies, and – where the range of variance in our empirical data is too narrow – perhaps 
even quasi-experiments in the form of computer simulations.15 Some of these steps – 
comparative reviews and larger-N studies in particular – call for systematic collaborative 
efforts. They therefore seem to be appropriate topics for discussion within the framework 
of this Concerted Action programme. 
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14
  More generally, it may well be a bit too easy to ‘get away’ with this kind of critique. In es-
sence, what it amounts to is an argument that in order to increase the predictive or explanatory 
performance of a model we should add new independent (or intervening) variables. The ar-
gument is often correct in itself, but if we pursue this strategy we tend to end up with long 
lists of presumably relevant factors and only vague ideas about their (hypothesised) impact. 
For the development of theory, work directed at (re-)specifying the relationship between or 
among variables already included in a model may often be at least as productive as searching 
for a near-exhaustive inventory of independent variables. 
15
  One of the challenges facing empirical studies with a narrow range of variance for important 
independent variables is to determine the impact of factors that come out as ‘constants’. By it-
self, a constant accounts for nothing of the variance actually observed along the dependent 
variable(s). It may nonetheless be a very important factor. Whenever expanding the range of 
observations is not a feasible option, ‘thought experiments’ may be the only approach we can 
use to shed light on the significance of a constant. Thought experiments can employ different 
techniques, but a general requirement is that they be made in a way that ensures a fair degree 
of stringency and transparency. It would be difficult to argue that the somewhat implicit 
mode of counter-factual reasoning that we find in much of the case-study literature can be 
considered generally superior by those standards. 
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